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SAFETY REGULATION 
Nina Cornell, Roge r Noll and Barry Weingast* 
Since the late 1 96 0 s ,  Congres s has enacted s everal laws 
that expand and amplify the role of the federal government in inter­
vening in p rivate market decisions on matte r s  relating to the 
safety of products and workplaces.  This legi slation has increas ed 
the number of policy instruments available to the government with 
respect to s afety i s s ue s ,  and has created s everal new government 
agencies with s afety regulatory responsibilities.  So dramatic has 
been the app earanc e, if not the r eality, of increas ed government 
control over product and worker safety that the s e  activities, along 
with environmental cont rols, recently have come to be called the
" new regulation, 11 
As used herein, the term 11 safety regulation" refers to 
policie s that seek to prevent parties to private market transactions 
from taking certain risks that they would otherwi s e  a s s ume. The 
dis tinction between safety regula tion and environmental r e gula� 
tion is that the latte r  involve s limits on the risks that par tie s 
*Part  of the cos t s  of preparing this manuscript w e r e  paid from
a grant from the National Science Foundation program for Res earch 
Applied to National Needs,  grant #APR75 - 1 6566.  
to  t ransactions can impos e  on othe r s .  In practice, the line between 
s afety and environmental regulations is fuzzy since both attack 
many of the same problem s .  As defined here, radiation inside a 
nuclear pow e r  plant is a safety is sue since it consf:itute s  a hazard 
for employees  at the facility, while radiation outside the facility 
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but emanating from it is an environmental problem because it affects 
everyone in the area, regardless of their employment status or  
their consumption of  elect ricity. Or, a manufacturing proc e s s  that 
involve s  the us e of a dange rous chemical may threaten workers  at 
the plant if it is releas ed into the workplace, consumers of the 
p roduct if they are expos ed to an unsafe amount of it, and people in 
general if the waste products of the manufacturing proce s s  are 
released into the atmosphere or waterway s .  Cons equently, environ­
mental, occupational and consumer safety regulatory activities are 
not always clearly distinguishable,  
THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL SAFETY REGULATION 
Despite the recent bur s t  of regulatory legislation, there is 
nothing n ew about the exist ence of government r egulation of safety. 
The Food and Drug Administration is one of the oldest  federal 
I 
regulatory agencies,  having been established in 1906.  Control of 
radiation hazards at nuclear  pow er facilities is as old as the 
technology, dating from the early 1 95 0 s .  
T he flurry of activity in creating n,ew safety - related 
agencies and passing new r egulatory law s has led to only an incre-
' 
mental increas e in the number of items and activities covered by 
r egulatory activity. In mos t  cas e s ,  concern by the federal govern­
ment p redated the new regulatory law or the creation of a new 
agency. Some of the new q.genci e s  devote much of their effort to 
enforcing law s that were shifted from one agency to another. For 
example, the Consumer Product Safety Commis sion ( CPSC)  was 
as signed responsibility for the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, formerly the domain of 
the FDA, and the Flammable Fabrics Act, previously administered 
by the Federal Trade Commis sion, In the first two years of the 
CPSC, twenty-one of the twenty - nine petitions that were granted 
by the agency dealt with inherited act s .  }:_I In other instances
1 /  - S e e  CPSC Index, Office of the Secretary, April 1 9 75. 
new agencie s were formed by pulling toge ther office s  
from a variety of departments in the executive branch, as  
was  the cas e  in  the  cr eation of  the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Finally, s ev e ral of the major statutes  of this period are acts that 
amend older legis lation dealing with the sam e  clas s of problems.  
Obvious examples are the 1 9 70 air  and 1 9 72 water pollution control 
acts and the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1 9  72, 
which are merely the latest  in a fairly long s tream of attempts to 
cope with the s e  p roblems . �/ 
�/ For more detail on the history of air and water pollution
control efforts s e e  Allen Kneese and Charles Schultze, Pollution, 
Prices and Public Policies, B rookings  Institution, Washington, 
D. C. , 1 9 75 .  
Although the proliferation of laws and agencies may not 
have led to a large increas e in the number of regulated items and 
activities ,  it has led to ove rlapping jurisdiction s ,  For example, 
both the Con s umer P roduct Safety Commis sion and the Environ­
mental Protection Agency have jurisdiction over hazardous house -
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hold chemicals, the former becaus e of its administ ration of the 
Poison Prevention Packaging Act and the Hazardou s  Subs tances 
Act, and the latter because of its conc ern with the disposal of 
hazardous materials .  When EPA forced farmers to switch from 
using DDT and related compounds to the organo-phosphates becaus e  
o f  the environmental hazards o f  the former, rules were e s tablished
to protec t farm worke rs  from the new p e s ticide s, which are 
highly toxic . Both EPA and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Adminis tration had the authority to s e t  the rule s;  they 
were finally set by EPA because OSHA' s formulation was 
challenged in court. 
Another cons equence of recent s afety- related legislation 
has been a shift of regulatory responsibilities from the states to 
the federal government. The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1 9 70 converted what had been almos t  exclusively a s tate function 
into a federal one. 1/ The legis lation recognized the historic
}_/ 
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One exception was the Longshoremen' s and Harbor Worker' s  
Compens ation Act of 1 92 7 which established federal job safety 
regulation for long shoremen by the Department of Labor's Bureau 
of Labor Standard s ,  These  responsibilities w e r e  eventually 
absorbed by OSHA. 
r esponsibility of the states  by permitting: them to s ubmit 
plans to OSHA for running their own occupational s afety 
and health programs . OSHA is required to approve state 
plans if they· are at least as stringent as the federal 
p rogram, Money has been available to the states for the s e  activitie s 
on a fifty-fifty cos t  s haring basis.  Becaus e the states only receive 
fifty percent federal financing, compared to one -hundred percent 
federal funds for 11letting OSHA do it , 11 states have been reducing 
their involvement in policing on- the-job safety and health. Of 
fifty- six j urisdictions entitled to s ubmit plans to OSHA and receive 
f ederal money, only tw enty - two now have approved plans and the 
number is declining. North Dakota, Montana, New Jersey, New 
York, Illinois and Wisconsin all have removed thems elves from 
occupational safety r egulation des pite having approved plans • .  �. / 
j_ /  New York Times,  1 9 75 .
OSHA budget review s reveal that Congres s ind eed intended 
to make occupational s afety predominantly a federal activity. Table 
1 show s the budget s ubmissions to Congr e s s  by OSHA for enforce ­
ment activities and the actual appropriations , broken down betw e en 
federal and s tate activities .  While the Administration consistently 
r eque sted more appropriations for s ta te enforcement activitie s 
(where the federal money would "be matched by an equal amount of 
s tate money) ,  Congr e s s  con sistently cut the amount slated for the 
s tate s and increas ed the amount reques ted for OSHA1 s own inspec­
tion s taff. T he final outcome of the federal appropriations p roc e s s  
has not only be en to shift responsibility from the s tates  t o  the 
5 
federal gove rnment. In addition, the total amount s p ent on enforce­
ment has indirectly been reduced becaus e the shift to federal enforce­
ment reduced s tate matching expenditures . At the s ame time, 
federalization of s afety regulation r educes compliance costs  of firms 
by eliminating the p roblem of trying to satisfy conflicting standards.  
A s imilar s hift in responsibility from the s t ates to the 
federal government took place with the passage of the Safe D rinking 
Water Act of 1 9 74.  Until the pas sage of this act, the safety of 
d rinking water s upplie s  was a federal concern only when the water 
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c ro s s ed state boundarie s ,  The Safe Drinking Water Act made 
drinking water supplies a matter of federal concern, It calls fo r 
standards of purity to be es tablished by the federal government and 
requires that all drinking water systems conform to the s tandards 
within a y ear of their adoption, Primary enforcement respons ibility 
can be given to the states provided that they establish pro cedures at 
least as st ringent as those  of the federal government. E./ Although 
2/ Safe Drinking Water Act: Repo rt to Accompany HR 1 3 002,  
Hous e of Repres entatives,  9 3 rd Congr e s s ,  2nd Ses s ion, Report 
No, 93 - 1 1 85 ,  
the Safe Drinking Water Act provides s eventy - five per cent 
federal financing for approved state plans,  rather than the fifty 
percent provided for oc cupational safety and health regulation, the 
pos sibility of full federal preemption that has led states to abandon 
their own job safety prog rams could also lead to de cis ions on the 
part of states to let the federal government assume total respons i ­
bility for determining safe levels of chemicals and bacteria in 
drinking water and for s etting and enfor cing standard s ,  
Anothe r effect o f  the new safety legislation i s  that it has 
increa s ed the number  of regulatory rules and procedures that a 
s pecific plant or firm may face, Each law established different 
p roc edures that the respons ible agency may or must us e, For 
example, both OSHA and FDA regard the presence of rats in a food 
p roces s ing plant as an unacceptable hazard, the forme r becaus e of 
danger to employees and the latter becaus e of danger to consume rs ,  
I f  an  inspector from the Food and Drug Adminis t ration finds rats 
on the premis es ,  the proce s s o r  can only be fined if the inspector 
can convince the local U, S. attorney to pros ecute and the cas e  is 
7 
6 / won. - If an OSHA ins pecto r finds the plant out of compliance
!!_/ For an examination of FDA pro cedures and their con s e ­
quences,  see  Melvin Hinich and Richard Staelin, "A Proces s Model 
of Food Regulation, " mimeo, Virginia Polyte chnic Ins titute, 1 9 76 ,  
with OSHA regulations on vermin control, the manufacture r c;i.n 
be cited and fined virtually on the spot, Becaus e of overlapping 
regulations by IDA and OSHA, the same violation can lead to 
very d ifferent outcomes depending upon which agency smells 
the rat . 
The proliferation of regulatory tools is exemplified by the 
var ious actions that could hav e been taken against Life Science 
Products Company, the manufacturer of Kepone,  Dis charges of 
Kepone by Life Sciences into the public sewage sy stem of Hopewell, 
Virginia, led to contamination of the entire James River es tuary, 
causing large los s es to the fish and shellfish industries that were 
bas ed there. Uns afe production practices within the plant led to  
s evere illnes s  and disability for many of  the plant ' s worke r s .  
Mas s ive dis charge s o f  Kepone from the factory into the a i r  we re 
worrisome for tho se  who breathed it because Kepone is a 
k . 
7/nown carcinogen.-
JJ For more detail on the Kepone contamination from the Life
Sciences plant, see  the Washington Post, January 1, 2, 3, 4, 1 9 76,  
At least four different federal regulatory law s a re applic­
able in this case:  the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1 970,  the 
Federal Water Pollution qont rol Act Amendments of 1 9 72,  the
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1 9 72, and the 
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Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1 9 70,  Only the latter two 
law s could have brought federal inspecto rs  directly into the plant 
in connection with the production of Kepone; the forme r two 
depend upon the re being discharge limits on Kepone or  its 
components. 
Although the Kepone plant was eventually clo s ed by Virginia 
public health officials ,  three other authorities could also have acted, 
EPA could have fo rced the company to register its output as a 
pes ticide under the 1 9 72 Federal Environmental Pesti cide Control 
Act, which would hav e  required the company to submit test data to 
EPA on Kepone arid its environmental effects ,  This would have 
given EPA the right to inspect the plant to ensure compliance with 
the various provisions of the pesticide act, OSHA could have 
inspected the plant without advance warning, and could have closed 
the plant wider the " imminent hazard" claus e of the Occupational 
8 / Safety and Health Act.- In addition, the city could have clo s ed the
§_/ P. L, 91 - 5 9 6, Sec, 6 (c )  ( 1 )
factory by denying it connection to the s ew er sys tem, B efo re the 
dis charges went into the James River, they pas s ed through the 
Hopewell s ewage treatment plant, killed the bacteria that digested 
the s ewage, and thereby disabled th'e city' s t reatment facilities, 
Although safety regulation is  not new, its s cope and 
emphasis  have changed dramatically. The federal government is  
obviously devoting much mo re attention to  the problems 0£ product 
and worker safety than it has in the past, This is evident in the 
number and extent of new law s that have been pas s ed and in the 
federal budgetary outlays to finance these regulatory activities ,  
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
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created in 1 9 7 1 ,  now spends over $ 1 00 million annually on federal 
regulato ry activities that are fo r the mos t  part new , Another 
s trong s ignal that the impact of safety regulation has grown is that 
the new agencies and policies are extremely controve rsial. The 
busines s  community, in particular, sees the new s afety regulatory 
fervor as a source of major,  unnecessary inc reases in the cos ts  
of doing bus iness  and has said so repeatedly in  Congress ional 
hearings and court appeals to regulatory decis ions , 
Attention to safety measures basically stems from two 
concerns,  One is  to  ensure that preventive meas ures are taken 
whenever prevention is less  expensive than the damages  that would 
otherwise  occur, A second conc ern is w ith equity: los s e s  due to 
hazards do not fall evenly on the population, and some lo s s  in over­
all efficiency may be considered appropriate in order to prevent 
s udden drastic los s es that fall unevenly on relatively few people , 
Sev eral approaches can be taken to achieve the object ives  
that underlie a concern over safety. In principle, at  least, the 
government could choos e not to intervene, The market, dominated 
by a principle 0£ buyer (and worker) beware ( caveat emptor ) ,  would 
then determine the extent to which prev entive measures  w ould be 
taken. A purely market approach ass igns respons ibility for damages  
to  consumers and workers,  who would, in  turn, alte r thei r  economic 
behavior  in a manner  that would cause  price s and wages  to reflec t  
the a s sociated  risks. 
S ev eral types of intervention can be impos ed upon the 
caveat emptor  market system. One is to  establish a body of tort 
principles  (liability law s )  and to permit those  damaged to s ue for 
compensation on a case by cas e basis ,  A second is to establish 
some form 0£ no -fault liability and compensation system that 
eliminates the need to prove responsibility on a case by case basis .  
This could be done either through some form of  mandatory insurance 
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o r  through a tax on injur i e s .  Still a third option is intervention to 
increas e the information available to tho s e  who enter the market , 
whether s t rictly caveat emptor o r  mod.Hied by the existence of 
some fo rm of liability and compensation sys tem. Finally , the 
government can s et safety standards . 
The purpo s e  of this paper is to contribute some insight 
into tlie problem of deciding how and when the ·government ought 
to int ervene to affect product and o ccupational s afety . The next 
s e ction examines the workings of the market, d evelops a set  ·of 
c riteria for government intervention, and dis cu s s e s  the alternative 
policy inst rument s available to the government, Next, the paper 
a s s e s s e s  the performanc e  to date of two safety regulatory agencie s ,  
the Consumer Product Safety Commis s ion and the  Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration. Finally , it pres ents some 
recommendations for policy chang e s ,  
T H E  RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENTAL INTERV ENTION 
The obvious stated purpo s e  of safety regulation is to 
r educe t he incidence of death, illne s s  and injury due to unsafe 
p roducts and wo rkplac e s ,  Presumably the decis ion to a chieve 
the s e  goal s by means of safety regulation involve s  two judgments: 
that in the abs ence of government int ervention, products and wo rk­
places w ill not be " safe enough" and that the mo st effective form 
of intervention is standard-setting regulation. 
The first judgment requires an a s s e s sment of the likely 
performance of the pure p rivate market sy stem, Practically 
speaking, the range of pos s ible institutional alternative s for such 
intervention doe s not include a completely unfettered market. 
C ommon law has long held that partie s to economic trans ac tions 
are accountable (liable) for some typ e s  of avoidable, damaging 
1 1  
consequence s of the transaction that are initially borne by the 
other par ty. Neve rthele s s ,  a s se s sing the likely pe rformance of 
a purely caveat emp·�or economy i s  ins tructive . If a pure marke t  
system produce s l e s s  saf ety than consumer s  and wor ke r s  would 
be willing to pay for (in either highe r prices or lowe r wage s ) ,  a 
rationale for governmental intervention of some kind will have 
been shown. Examination of the source of the se failu r e s  provide s 
a set  of pe rformance criteria with which to a s s e s s  the various 
ways the gove rnment might inte rvene. 
The Pure Market System 
Unde r  a caveat emptor ma rket system, any c o s ts of  
accidents aris ing from products o r  employm.ent would be borne 
by consume r s  and worke r s .  If c omple te information about 
hazard s were free ,  individual e conomic deci s ions would force 
prices of hazardous produc ts to be lower,  and wage s for 
hazardous employment to be highe r ,  than safe r alternative s .  
The lower p rices  and highe r wage s would exactly cove r the c o s t  
to the consume r s  and worke r s  o f  a s suming th e  risks o f  the 
hazards .  If  the c.o s t  to  produce r s  of p reventing a hazard wa s 
le s s  than the c o s t  of damage s ,  produc e r s  could incr e a se their 
p rofits b y  taking p reventive mea sure s .  Thu s ,  under the condition 
of complete and free information, a purely private , � 
emptor market would minimize the total cost  of prevention 
plus compensation for hazard s • .2 / But if: information i s
J. /  See Walter Y .  Oi, " The Economi c s  of Produ c t  Safety, 11 
Bell Journal of Economic s ,  Vol. 4, No. 1 (Sp ring 197 3 ), PP• 3 -28. 
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not free and, in any event, is incomplete, this  happy result will 
not generally obtain. 
The problem of information c o s ts 
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Information about risks  is acquired in  two ways: expe rience 
and study. Exp e rience is  gained by ob s erving the consequences of 
one ' s  own decisions as  an employ ee and consumer and by observing 
the fate of othe r s ,  Study cons ists  of a n  active s earch fo r informa ­
t ion about product o r  wo rkplace characteristics,  such as by studying· 
te chnical information, health and injury s tatistics,  or journalistic 
r eports,  
Neither method of acquiring info rmation is free. Learning 
by experience r eq uires  accepting unknown risks until sufficient 
information is gained about the s afety cons equences of various 
decisions ,  which can be costly if the t rue risk is higher than initially 
expected. Learning by experience als o  takes time, and requires  
that fo r s ome period an individual mus t  expect to make decis ions 
that are less  s atisfactory to him than would be the decis ions based 
upon more complete knowledge, 
T he desirability of a strategy of learning by experience 
obviously dep ends crucially on the nature of the decision and the 
extent of the risk, The cos ts a s s ociated with learning by 
experience are r elatively low for inexp ensive, frequently pur chased 
consume r p roducts which are a s sociated with only minor potential 
safety p roblems .  In such a circumstance, information about the 
consequence s  of using a p roduct can be gained r elatively cheaply 
and quickly, without running the risk of a s erious undesirable 
effect. At the oth e r  extreme, if a particular economic action is 
infrequently taken, has a s ubstantial cost  and require s  the a s s ump ­
tion of a potentially very s e rious hazard, the costs  of gaining 
info rmation through experienc e about the frequency and nature 
of the hazard are relatively high. 
Learning through study provides an alternative to 
accepting unknown risks in order to learn through experience, 
In o rder to adopt this st rat egy, an individual must be able to 
acquire and comprehend relevant information from s e condary 
sources about the hazards as s o c iated with a decision, 
Some kinds of s afety-relat ed info rmation are relatively 
easy to obtain, s uch as through the publication of product testing 
results by consumer groups o r the inclusion of pertinent informa­
t ion on product package s .  Neverthel es s,  a private market economy 
is likely to provide too little info rmation about hazards.  One 
s ource of difficulty is that a firm has no incentive to advertise the 
danger of its product, e s p ecially when its competitors do not warn 
of the hazards of their own products. Anoth e r  source of difficulty 
is that a firm in the bus ine s s  of p roviding valuable information can­
not us ually charge all who use it. Through casual perscnal contacts 
info rmation can be transmitted from person to person, with only 
the first  person in the chain paying for it, such as by lending a 
tes ting report to a friend. And, the higher the p rice charged for 
the published information, the greater the likelihood that a particular 
individual will attempt to s eek out an informed friend, rather than 
pur cha s e  the information dire ctly , The greater the cost  of testing 
the nature of a hazard and dis s eminating th
.
e results, the less  likely 
it is that a private organization can recoup: its cos ts by s elling the 
information even though the value of the ido rmation to its users 
exceeds its cos t s .  
Even i f  the s upplier of information can effectively cover 
costs  by s elling test  resul.t s ,  the extent to which the info rmation is 
dis s eminated is still likely to be too restricted, Once a t es t  has 
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been c ompleted,  no costs other than those as sociated with communi­
cating the re sult need be incurred to add one person to the li st  of 
tho se receiving the information. Information i s  a type of public 
good; increa sing the number of people who have acce s s  to it has 
no effe c t  on the costs that were incurred in generating it. A s  long 
as the price of the information exceeds the c o s ts of communicating 
it -- that is ,  the price covers some of the cost  of generating the 
information -- some people will regard the information a s  too 
expensive e ven though they are willing to pay the true costs to 
society of giving it  to them, 
The preceding discus sion lead s naturally to the conclu sion 
that a p o tentially u seful role for government is to provide informa­
tion on the ri sk s of product and employment hazard s. Since the 
socially efficient price for information is the cost  of communicating 
i t, the system that generate s and di s seminate s information mus t, if 
it is to b e  efficient, generate less  revenue tha n the co s ts it incur s .  
I n  s uch a s ituation, the government can collect the s hortfall of 
revenues in r elation to costs through the taxation system, using 
the revenues gained thereby to s ubs idize the production of informa­
tion. 
Alternatively, the government could require that producers 
keep worker s and consumers fully informed about the hazards of 
workpla c e s  and products as a necessary condition for doing busine s s .  
Government would then assume an enforc ement respon s ibility, 
che cking to s ee that information was being adequately communicated 
and spot- checking the quality of information by performing its 
own te s t s . 
Unfortunately, a s s uring that all that is known about a 
hazard i s  available to individuals at a price equal to the cos t  of 
communicating i t  to them will not neces sarily make product s and 
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workplac e s  sufficiently safe. The c o s ts a s s o ciated with learning 
by study are more than simply the costs  of acquiring a rele van t. 
publication or printing a more informative d e scription of a produc t. 
Once the information is acquired,  it must be studied, and if it i s  
complicated or technically sophi s ticated the costs a s sociated with 
comprehending it can be very high. A s  i s  the case with the produc­
tion of the information, the proce s s  of comprehending and 
interpreting the information is itself a public good as long a s  the 
ta s te s  of individuals are roughly the same. Tha t  is to say, if 
one person is sure that another per s on is equally de sirous of 
a voiding cancer, the fir s t  per son can avoid the costs of proces sing 
information by ob serving the e conomic behavior of the second 
per son after the latter has received, c omprehended and interpreted 
a report about the carcinogenic propertie s of a product. The first  
per son i s ,  in e s sence , delegating the power of  a s s e s sing the 
hazards a s sociate d  with a de cision to the second. While thi s 
delegation reduce s the likelihood tha t  the decision will exactly 
reflect the ta s te s  of the fir s t  per son, it also reduce s the total costs 
of making the decision. The more homogc;meous the ta s te s  of 
Person I and Per s on II and the greater the costs of acquiring and 
.I 
proce s sing the information, the more likely tha t  both will find 
delegation of the deci sion to one per son the more effi cient mechanism 
for evaluating safety information. 
The formation of a regulatory agency is the ultimate form 
of delegation. One dimension of the probt"em of evaluating the
de sirability of a regulatory in stitution i s  .Jvhether the costs it save s 
with r e spect to information generation and e valuation offset the 
c o s ts i t  impo se s because its s tandards are not consonant with the 
ta s te s  and perception s of. risk of those it is trying to prote c t. Quite 
obviously, an agency nee d  not -- and probably can not -- perfectly 
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reflect all perc eptions of risk and ta stes  for safety. The more 
dive rgent are ta stes for safety among memb e r s  of society, the 
le s s  likely it is that individuals will, on balance,  regard the 
agenc y ' s  s tandards a s  providing a net benefit to them.JR/ 
JR/ For a more thorough treatment of this approach to under­
standing safety regulations , see Melvin J ,  Hinich,  "A Rationaliza­
tion for Con sumer Support for  Food Regulation, " mimeo, VPI, 
January 1 97 5 .  
The preceding analysis ha s focused o n  the problem of 
pos se s sing sufficient information to make valid judgments about 
a particular economic decision. In theory, at lea s t, the informa­
tional requirements for any de cision to be strictly rational are 
mo re s tringent than the pre ceding discus sion sugge sts. To the 
extent tha t each economic action repre sents a c hoice among 
alternative�, the requirement for the optimal re sponse to risks of 
hazard s is that information be a_vailable for all of the alternative s .
In order for a consume r ' s  decision to buy a product bearing a 
particular hazard to incorpo rate the price di scount that is appro­
p riate to the risk,  the hazards a s sociated with alternative products 
mu s t  also be known. For this reason, impo sing i11fo1'mational 
requirements on some produce rs  of hazardou s products but not 
othe rs  can actually be counte rproductive. In the ab sence of other 
information, a consume r might reasonably a s sume that an unlabeled 
produc t  wa s of average hazardousne ss ,  or even bette r  than ave rage 
on the ground s that gove rnment had not chosen to force its producers  
to  adve rtise the risks a s sociated with it. In thi s situation, the 
consume r might reallocate consumption expenditure s in favor of 
unlabeled products in a manner that actually increased exposure 
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to hazard s. 
For the same rea son, safety standards for some products 
but not fo r othe rs  will, if not related to the extent of the hazard, 
unjustifiably reallocate expenditure s in favor of the products that 
lack s tandards by raising the price of the produc ts that must  be 
made more expensively to sati sfy the regulatory rule s .  Conse­
quently, the order in which standards are promulga ted  or informa­
tion requirements are imposed, as reflected in the prioritie s of 
the agency, should be selected on the basis of the indire c t  effects 
of each s tandard on exposure s to other hazards as  well as on the 
basis of the direct  threats a s sociated with the hazard that a 
standard is de signed to reduce.  
The problem of uncertainty 
Of course ,  it is unrealistic to expect  that complete infor­
mation about the hazard s of  all products and occupations is  available . 
If the nature of a hazard is uncertain, the ve ry concept of a rational 
decision is not well defined. 
An event is uncertain if the probability that it will occur 
cannot be known exactly. Uncertainty is normally distingui shed 
from risk because the two diffe r with re spect  to their implications 
for decision-making. An event is risky, but not uncertain, if it is  
neithe r impos sible nor sure (that is,  the probability of its  occurr­
ing is between zero and one ) ,  but its probability is nevertheles s 
known exactly. 
Uncertainty is  a broad, vague tetm that cove r s  several 
different circumstance s .  The lea s t  degree of uncertainty occurs 
when a pe rson think s that he probably knows how a system behave s ,  
but  ha s some doubts that the knowledge is  exactly right. For 
example, in to s sing a coin, a person knows that each side of a 
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"fair" coin i s  eq 11 l'k l ua Y l e Y to come up, but tha t, owing to the fac t
that coins a r e  gene rally n o t  s ymme trical, �ne s ide probably i s
more l ikely to come up than the other. To the extent tha t  a pe r son 
doe s not know exac tly the probability of each outcome , the re sult 
of the coin flip is unce rtain; to the extent tha t  a per son can never 
know the probab il itie s exac tly, the uncerta inty i s  irreducible , 
Two oth e r  type s  of uncertainty are important in safety 
i s sues. One occu r s  when a person knows that a causal l ink ex ists 
between a hazard and a damage, bu t is  unable to quantify it. For 
example, giving mice a m<J,s s ive exposure to a chemical and 
ob serving that in a short period of time the mice develop cance r 
e s tabli sh e s  tha t  a sub stance is carcinogenic. It doe s not e s tablish 
the extent to which the carcinogenic effe c t  depends upon the do sage, 
the type of tis sue exposed, the spec ie s  of the exper imental subject, 
the me thod of exp o sure, and the other feature s  of the environment 
in which the dosage wa s administered. Qualitatively, a per son may 
conclude tha t  the expe rimental re sults make it more l ikely tha t  the 
same sub stance in do sage s comparable to human exposure levels 
cau s e s  human cancer; howeve r the extent to which the likelihood 
has been inc reased is  not quantifiable. 
Still anothe r fo1·m of uncerta inty a r i se s from the 
realization that not all po s s ible causal relations have been 
re cognized. A s  s cientific knowledge grows, so, too, doe s the 
numbe r of perce ived relations between the human environment 
and the health sta tu s  of human be ings. 
The history of the use of freon and othe r fluorocarbons 
illu strate s the progre s s ion of knowledge through the var ious 
degre s s  or typ e s  of unce rtainty. Twenty yea r s  ago, the 
pos s ib ility that fluorocarbons, when released into the air,  
might de s tr oy the protective laye r of ozone in the earth ' s  outer 
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atmosphe re wa s not su spe cted. The uncerta inty was of the las t  
type. A s  s c ientific knowledge inc reased, the p o s s ibil ity of a 
cau sal conne ction grew in that laborato r y  expe r iments had shown 
tha t  ozone-depleting reactions were po s sible. Today s c ientists 
are certain that fluorocarbons erode the ozone layer, but the y  are 
not certain of the extent of oz one deple tion that can be expec ted or 
of the impac t  on human society of the increa sed expo sure to ultra­
violet light tha t  will re sult. 
The Lite ratu re on decis ion-making prin c iple s under 
conditions of  unc e rtainty s tre s s e s  the des i rability of  a vo iding 
cata s trophic mistake s and gathe ring more information that will 
reduce the amount of uncertainty. As illu strate d  by the fluoro­
carbon s tory, the extent of uncerta inty about a particular hazard 
is likely to decline over time. As a re sult, pos tponing d e c i s ion� , 
o r  at leas t  avoiding de c i s ions tha t  are irreve r s ible ( such a s
con suming a known carcinogen) or extremely c o s tl y  to change, 
increa se s the l ikelihood tha t  future dec i s ions will be more rational. 
In addition, as uncertainty diminishe s, the perceived de s irability 
of p a s t  policy dec i s ions will gene rally decline . Consequently, 
flexible d e c i s ion-making procedure s, ove r seen by ins titu tions 
capable of recognizing and re sponding expeditiously to past  
m i s take s ,  a re als o  advantageous. And becau s e  more knowledge 
is u seful for identifying b e tter decisions, inve stment in 
r e s e arch de s igned to reduce uncertainty is also l ikely to 
b e  desirable. 
The preceding ide a s  sum to a plea: for caution in dealing
with unknown hazards.  Instead of  basing decis ion s  on e stimate s 
of the expected consequence s of alte rnative outcomes - - a task
made impos sible when probab ilistic info1·mation is ab sent - - the s e
guideline s point to a more
. 
conse rvative cours e  o f  a c tion. One
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commonly u sed behavioral rule of this type is "minimax regret" -­
tha t  is ,  to adopt s trategies that a void the wo r s t  logically po s s ible 
outcome s ,  the reby minimizing the maximum po s s ible los s ,  
regardle s s  o f  the likelihood. that the maximum l o s s  will actually
occur . The rationality of minimax regret is highly controve r s ial, 
e specially among economis ts; however ,  political scientists have 
produced convincing evidence that, regardle s s  of its theoretical 
nicetie s ,  this dec i s ion rule is more con s i s tent with obs e r ve d  
political behavior·r� ·i s the notion that people maximize the 
expected value of the consequence s of thei r  dec i s ion s .  ill If thi s
ll / 
. 
- John A. Ferej ohn and Morris P. Fiorina, " The Paradox 
of Not Voting: A Decision Theor e tic Analysis,  11 American 
Political Science Review, Vol . 18, No. 2 (June 1974), pp. 52 5- 53 6 ,  
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and " Closene s s  C ounts Only in Horseshoe s and Dancing, 11 Ame rican 
Political Science Revie..y, Vol. 4 9, No. 3 (September 1975 ) ,  pp. 920- 92 5 .  
same behavior carrie s ove r into dec i s ions related to safety, i t  
would account fo r a political demand for controls on  product safety 
that are more s tringent than could be justified after-the-fa c t  when 
additional information make s p o s s ible a conventional analys i s  of 
expected benefits and costs .  
In sum, for seve ral rea s ons memb e r s  of society may be 
dis satisfied with the extent to which the private market system alone 
would prevent and compensate damage s from hazards.  If the se 
rationale s do unde rlie the demand for gove rnment inte rvention, 
c itizens  a re unlikely to be per suaded of the folly of gove rnment inter­
vention b y  ex post  benefit-cost  analyse s which show that a particular 
safety policy gene rated more c o s ts than benefits , s ince the se 
analys e s  a s sume away the p roblems that underpin the rationale s .  
This is  not to say that safe ty regulation i s  always wo rthwhile; tha t  
judgment doe s depend upon the ab solute and relative effec tivene s s  
and costs of re gulat·.>ry ver sus  othe r fo rms o f  inte rve ntion, 
The Liability Sys tem 
Safety regulation focu se s on pre venting damage s: A 
c entral p olicy i s sue is the extent to wh ich the problems tha t  
regulation s are de s igned to prevent could be bette r handled b y  
compensation after the damage s occur, namely b y  a system of 
le gal liability. 
The liability system doe s not lead to s ole reliance on 
compensation of past  damage s .  The p o s s ibility o f  compensation 
for damage s  cau s e s  firms to inve s t  in preventing accidents. 
B u s ine s s e s  can e s timate the amount of liability charge s they can 
exp e c t  to pay unde r diffe rent operating conditions, compare the se 
with the costs of diffe rent levels ·of prevention, and then choose  
the mix of  prevention and compensation that minimize s  their co sts.  
In order for a bu s ines sman' s  selection of a mix of preve ntion and 
compensation to be optimal, the expected liability of the firm mu s t  
equal the total expected damage arising from the firm ' s  e conomic 
a c tivitie s .  Unfor tunately, the liability system fails to accomplish 
thi s .  One source o f  failure lie s in damage c o s ts that a r e  not 
covered.  Another source of failure arise s when the extent of 
liability or damage is not c e rtain. 
Limits on liability 
The existing liability system l imits compensation in 
several ways. 
Firs t, the maximum extent of liability is  the net worth of 
the defendant corporation
.
s or individual s .  If a court awards 
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compensation in exce s s  of the ne t worth of th e defendants , the 
normal consequence is a bankrupc y  proceeding in which the plaintiff 
in the damage case eventually rece ive s some fraction of the com­
pensation that wa s awarded.  
Second, c ommon law sets additional limits to the liability 
arising f rom a particular a c tion. For example , certain kind s of 
c osts arising from a hazard may not be recove rable. One can not 
receive compensa tion for the time one spend s in court l itigating a 
c ivil suit, nor doe s one receive i.nte re s t  payments to compensate 
for the delay between the time an accident occu r s  and when the 
liability judgment is rendered.  Nor doe s it  pay the legal costs of 
initiating action. The l iability system is ver y  expensive to 
operate, e specially when a case mu s t  be litigated. The costs of 
the court system and legal repre sentation for both side s can 
exceed half the amount of damage s ,  and can take year s even to 
. ·1 12/come to tria . -
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on Med ical Malpractice,  Dept. of HEW, Publication No. 78-88 ,  
January 1 6 , 1 973, and Hearing on H. R .  1 378 , Hou se Committee on 
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Third, the total liability a s sociated with a particular 
hazard may be limite d legi slatively. The Price-Ander son Act, for 
example, limits the liability of  powe r companie s with re spe ct to 
the damage s ari sing from an accident a t  a nuclear power facility. 
As with other factors that lead to unde rcompensation, liability limits 
also blunt the incentive for preventive action by reducing the extent 
of c ompensation that might be avoided through p re vention. 
The effects of uncertainty and risk 
Another failure of the exis ting liability syste m  to provide 
optimal incentive s for prevention occu r s  when the co s ts and cau s e s  
o f  damage s a r e  not known with ce rtainty. For example, certain
chemicals are known to be carcinogenic when inhaled ,  but not all 
people who are exposed to them develop cance r and not all lung 
cance r is cau sed by inhalation of any particular compound. Conse­
quently, although the evidence e s tablishe s that a worker who is  
exposed to carcinogenic chemicals has a h ighe r  probability of 
developing lung canc e r  than a worke r who is not, to e stablish a 
cau sal link between the work environment and the health statu s  
o f  a particular employee i s  ve ry difficult.
The a s se s sment of liability, damage s and compensation 
depends upon the burden and s tandard of p roof. The burden of 
p roof in liability case s is  upon the p e r s on claiming damage , and 
the s tandard of p roof is  tha t  a p reponderance of evidenc e  sub­
s tantiate the claim that the damage wa s due to a hazard tha t  the 
defendant could reasonably have p revented. The standard of 
p roof in liability law i s  le s s  rigorou s  than that in criminal law "".­
the standard of no reasonable doubt -- but it  is more s tring e nt 
I 
than the s tandard applied in the judicial review of decisions by 
r e gulatory authoritie s .  In administrative proce s s e s, all  tha t  is  
required i s  that sub s tantial evidence support the decis ion of  the 
administrator -- that i s ,  that a rational pe
.
r s on could hold the 
same opinion a s  the administrato r ,  based on the evidence a t  
' f  th . . . h l 13 1 hand, even 1 e op1n1on is s a 'Y· 
�/ Kenneth Culp Davis ,  Administrative Law Text, We s t
Publishing Co. , St. Paul, Minnesota,  1 9 59, e specially section 
2 9. oz. 
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The exis ting liab ility system, by a s s igning the burden of 
proof to the party claiming injur y  and b y  e s tablishing a s tandard 
of proof that tolerate s s ome but only a relatively small amount of 
risk or un certainty, leave s  some damage s uncompen sated,  while 
it ove rcompensate s  others . To illu strate,  suppose that the 
evidence indicate s  tha t  the chance s  are one in ten that a particular 
hazard wa s reasonably avoidable and caused a particular health 
effe ct. In order for the firm to face incentive s for preventive 
action that are appropria te,  it should be liable for ten percent of 
the total damage s that are attributable to the hazard. Of course,  
it  is  not within the realm of civil liability law to find defendants 
ten pe rcent liable; they are eithe r  liable or they are not, and 
when the probabilitie s are thi s  small, they normally are not 
found liable . 
B y  similar argument, in s ome circumstance s the existing 
sy stem overcompen sate s  for damage s .  The standard of  proof tha t  
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i s  applied leave s room for some probability that the cau s e  o f  the 
damage wa s not the hazard at i s sue in the ca s e .  Suppose that a 
particular hazard is nin e ty percent likely to have cau sed a particular 
damage, and that this  i s  suffic ient to satisfy the standards of proof, 
Instead of awarding compensation of nine ty percent of the damag e s  
(which p rovide s the optimal incentive for taking preventive ac tion ) ,  the 
legal system will award compensation for all of the damage . Thi s  
error is  a likely e ventuality in certain kinds o f  medical malpractice 
suits .  One element of  proof of  medical malpractice is  whe the r the 
doctor o r  hospital followed standard medical practice in treating a 
patient. While standard medical practice may be more l ikely to 
cure a patient than quackery, cure l s  not certain - - e specially in 
ca s e s  of critical injury o r  major illne s s .  To fail to adju s t  
compen sation for the risks  that are inherent in standard medical 
p ractice lead s to overcompen sation. It also lead s to exce s s ive 
a ttention on action s to prevent malpractice claims,  such as  
exce s s ive te s ting of patients and exce s s ive timidity with re spec t
t . . 
11' 
o prom1 smg but non s tandard me thod s of treatment. -
1 4 /  - S e e  Medical Malpractice,  o p .  c it, and Hearings o n  H .  R .  1 3 78,
op. cit. 
Just as overcompen sation for damage s promote s exce s sive 
a ttention to prevention, undercompen sation lead s to too little 
prevention, A rational bu s ine s s  firm will inve s t  in preventive 
mea sure s to the poin t  at which the las t  dollar spen t on prevention 
reduce s  the amount of expected compen sation payments by an 
equivalent amount. If compen sation payments fall short of total 
damage s ,  additional preventive mea sure s would be worthwhile in 
tha t  total damages would be reduced by more than the c o s t  of 
p r e venting them. Furthermore,  the dive rgence of priva te 
preventive action s  from optimality i s  sys temmatically related to 
the features of the l iability system and the nature of the hazard. If 
the damaged party ha s the burden of proof, then more uncertainty 
a ttached to the l ink b etween a hazard and the extent of damage and a 
more s tringent standard of proof will increa s e  the liklihood tha t  
preventive action will be l e s s  than i s  economically warranted.  
One po s s ible mechanism fo r altering the incentive struc ture 
of the liability sy s tem i s  to rea s s ign the bu·rden of proof. For 
example, the burden could be placed upon: �n employe r to show tha t
a n  employee wa s n o t  damaged b y  the working environment. This 
would lead to the payment of compen sation in all ca se s in which 
the causal c onnection b e tween the hazard and the damage could 
ne ith e r  be proven nor disproven by prevailing standa rds of proof.
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Whoever bears the burden of proof in the se situations end s up 
paying the full damages,  which can lead to overcompensation if 
the defendant bears the burden. 
The Workman' s Compensation sy stem offers an example 
of the effe cts of both changing the burden of proof and of limiting 
total liability.  Workmen ' s  Compensation laws were de signed to 
alter the liability system a s  it applied to accidents on the job . 
Ba sically, Workmen' s Compen sation laws reduce the standard of 
proof by eliminating the requirement that an employee show that 
an accident was " cau sed" by a failure on the part of the employer 
to take reasonable steps to remove hazards from the workplace. 
Furthermore, the laws require that employers carry insurance 
to secure the fund s to pay off claims that may ari s e  under the 
program. B oth of the se change s in the liability system work to 
increa se the amount of compen sation paid and the amount of 
prevention that employers voluntarily choose. Thi s  is mitigated 
by the fact that Workmen ' s  Compensation sets fixed upper limit s 
on the amount paid per claimant. Limiting the amount a worker 
can claim at least partially offsets the effect s of e a sing the burden 
of proof and guaranteeing payment of proven damage s .  It als o  
re sult s i n  le s s  change i n  the relative reliance upon prevention 
than would have occurred in the ab sence of the liability limit s .  
The existing Workman ' s  Compensation system -- or any 
similar system one can practically imagine -- is  b ound to lead 
to seriou s inefficienc e s. The problem is that the c ompensation 
that is appropriate from the perspective of providing proper 
incentive s to producers is the expected value of damage s  before 
the fact, wherea s  the proce s s  by which damage s are actually 
compensated is primarily a me chanism for protecting individuals 
against los s  of income due to avoidable accident s .  The former 
principle require s that compensation be systemmatically related 
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t o  the probability that the hazard caused the damage and that a 
particular damage actually oc curred,  wherea s  the latter principle 
requires that the frcus be the magnitude of the loss  of the 
damaged party. 
The d ifference in the se app1·oache s is apparent from the 
following illu stration. Suppose a workplace pre sents two hazards 
to its employe e s .  One is that a chemical pre sent in the plant 
increases by two percent the probability that a worker will die of 
cancer. The other is that a particular machine is known occasion­
ally to inflict a minor cut on the arm of a cautiou s operator. Thu s ,  
i f  a worker die s o f  cancer , the chance s are relatively  small that 
the workpla c e  caused it, while if the worker is cut by the machine 
it is certain that the injury is work related. Under the existing 
system, the former case would almost surely lead to no liability 
judgment against the employer, while the latter would almo st surely 
be covered by Workmen ' s  Compensation. A sub stantially lower 
standard of proof than the pre sent one would lead to compensation 
for both worker s .  Yet, from the per spective of.economic efficiency, 
both systems provide a proper incentive for pre venting cuts while 
neither system provide s the proper incentive for preventing cancer. 
The compensation system that achieve s the latter end is to award 
the heirs of every worker who is a cancer victim two percent of 
the costs a s sociated with the worker ' s  death and full compensa-
tion for cut arms .  Of course,  the latter compensation per affected 
worker is likely to be much smaller than :the former since the 
damage s a s sociated with prema ture death are normally regarded 
as being far more than fifty time s as seriou s as  those  ari sing 
fr�m a minor cut. 
The problem of adequate compensation ver su s appropriate 
incentive s i s  exacerbated if, before the fact, one is uncertain about 
the nature of the relationship between the hazard and the damage 
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suffe red. Then the issue of devi sing a system of compensation that 
provide s prop e r  economic incentive s is incapable of r e solution for 
the same reas on s  pre sen ted in the preceding discus sion of uncertain 
e vents. One must, instead, rely upon appeals to principle s of equity 
and upon the likelihood that a compensation system can be change d  
i n  re sponse to new information i n  selecting the appropriate liability 
standards. One frame of refe rence for a s signing liability is on the 
ba s i s  of who i s  nn s t  likely to make the mo s t  efficient choice b e tween 
15/ p r e vention and compensation . - If a firm i s  more likely than its
J2/ Guido Calab re s i, Cos ts of Accidents, New Haven, Yale
Univ. Pre s s ,  1 970. See also Pete r  A. Diamond and Jame s A. 
Mirrlee s ,  " On the A s signment of Liability: The Uniform Ca se,  1 1
B ell Journal o f  Economic s, Vol. 6 No. 2 (Autumn 1 975 ) ,  p .  487 - 51 6 .  
employ e e s  and cu stomer s  to pos s e s s  comple te knowledge about 
the safety of its working conditions and products,  then a s signing 
liability to the firm will lead to lowe r information costs and a 
be tter choice b e tween pre vention and compensation than would 
re sult if worke r s  and consume rs  were liable. Workmen ' s  
Compensation, while lowe ring compensation limits ,  save s the 
relatively high co s ts of operating the civil l iability system, It also 
protects more people against capriciou s lo s s  of income by lowering 
the standards of p roof, 
Ba sed upon the preceding analysi s ,  the liability system 
appea r s  to be fraught with source s of ineffic iency. Ne ve rthele s s ,  
in some circum s tanc e s  it  p robably doe s n o t  fare badly i n  com­
par i s on with the alternative s .  B ecau se of the nature o f  the 
l iability system, it should be relatively effective in dealing with 
e vents that have ce rtain cau s e s  and that inflict damage s  tha t do not 
pu sh against  institutionalized limits to compensation. Its effective-
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ne s s  i s  s e ve rely mitigated by the co s ts of civil litigation, which 
make s it le s s  efficient the lowe r the probable damage. 
Insurance 
Anothe r mechani sm for dealing with damage co s ts due to 
acc idents is insurance.  The expected los s  to each p e r son from a 
risky hazard can be calculated by multiplying the probability of 
the event time s the damage it cau s e s .  If each per son face s  a 
particular haza rd, if the likelihood that one per son will be  
damaged i s  unrelated to the likelihood the other will als o  be 
damaged, and if during each time period each pe r s on pays  the 
expected l o s s  into a common fund, ove r  the long run the fund will 
have sufficient re source s to pay all of the damage s .  Thi s i s  the 
ba sic notion behind in surance. An insurance fund allows a large 
group of people to conve rt an occa sional, large financial lo s s  into 
a regular , certa in, small one. The profitability of insurance 
companie s ari s e s  because  people are, in general, willing to pay 
slightly more than their expected los s  in order to be protected 
against an infrequent major setback. 
If a hazard create s risk but not uncertainty, the higher 
wage s or lower price s a s s ociated with it will diffe r from other 
p ric e s  and wage s by the difference in expected los s  plu s some 
premium fo r a s suming the risk. 161 Thi s differential, in turn, can
16 / See Oi, op. cit. 
be used to purcha s e  insurance again s t  the risk, a s suming that the 
damage s  experienced by each p e r son are independent of the dama g e s  
expe rienced by other s. If the damages are not independent, insur­
ance may not be available·, or if it i s ,  will be more expens ive than 
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in the ca se of independence , Moreove r ,  insurance that p rotects 
again s t  the total damage suffe red from the hazard will s till not 
generally be made available . Complete insurance would make 
in sure d individual s indiffe rent as to whether the hazardous e vent 
actually occur s ,  even if the th reat of the hazard is premature 
death. Even if it we re possible for pe ople to place a value on 
premature death and insure again s t  it, the reby becoming indiffer­
ent be tween life and death, such insurance will not be offered if 
the behavior of the insured pe rson can s ignificantly affect the 
probability of the damage occurring . The problem that a r i s e s  
i s  called "moral hazard, 1 1  which refe r s  t o  the s ituation i n  which 
the pre sence of insurance reduce s the incentive of the in sured 
par ty to take normal precautions again s t  the e vent for which 
. . 1 d 17/ insurance 1s pure 1ase  , -
17 I Kenneth A. Ar row, " Uncertainty and the Economics of 
Medical Care , 1 1  Ame rican Economic Review, Vol. 5 3 ,  No. 5 
(Decemb e r  1 963 ) ,  p. 941-973. 
As the extent of insurance cove rage again s t  hazard s 
inc rea s e s ,  one would expect, ba sed upon the moral hazard argu­
ment, to find a growing dis incentive to take adequate precaution s 
aga in s t  haza rd s .  In fact, insurance companie s de vote consider­
able efforts to se tting safety standards  for plac e s  of employment 
tha t purcha s e  Workmen ' s  Compensation insurance.  Individual 
and group medical insurance companie s ,  howeve r,  cannot 
practically monitor the behavior of each p e r son to make certain 
that prop e r  safeguard s agains t  illne s s  and accident are being taken. 
Insurance also may fail to cover damages completely when 
the re i s  uncerta inty. If a hazard i s  subject to unc ertainty, an 
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insurance scheme in which the insurance premium i s  system­
matically related to the expected los s  is not pos sible .  The reason 
is  that the expecteci loss cannot be calculated if the probability of 
the damaging event is unknown. 
The preceding arguments lead to two additional source s 
of demand for safety regulation. Fir s t, insurance companie s 
p e rce ive potential gain in safe ty regulation because  it reduce s 
the problems aris ing from moral hazard and stands to transfe r 
some of the ir s tanda rd- setting activitie s to the government budget. 
Second, s ince insurance is,  in any event, incomplete , s ome 
individual s seek more s tringent safety standa rds to p rotect agains t  
capricious los s e s  of income that are not insured,  
The Role of  R egulation 
The foregoin g  discus s ion leads to the conclu s ion that in a t  
lea s t  two s itua tions the marke t sy stem plu s insurance and liability 
laws is likely to gene rate insufficient incentive s for p roviding 
economically warranted prevention from hazard s .  One i s  
s i tuations i n  which the risks of a hazard a r e  e ithe r known o r  
knowable , b u t  the cos ts o f  acquiring o r  comprehend ing informa­
tion about it are high. The other is if e ithe r  the full nature of 
the hazard or the chance of its occurring are unce rtain. 
In b oth situations more information about health and safe ty 
hazard s is likely to be  e specially valuable.  S ince the pr ivate 
sector will normally have insufficient incentive to produce an 
economically warranted amount of safety tnformation, a central 
role of regulators is to inc rea se  the amount of information available 
by unde rtaking re sea rch, by supporting the research of others,  and 
by imp o s ing informational requirementB on industry. 
Once a flow of information i s  acquired, the agency ha s 
several additional policy options .  The simple s t  is  s imply to 
32  
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diss eminate the data, allowing individuals to alter their economic 
behavio r in ways consistent with their own tastes and attitudes 
towards ri sk. This st rategy will improve matters if the info rma ­
tion that is produced is relevant and can be as s embled and comp re ­
hended sufficiently cheaply that individuals have adequate incentive 
to use it.  An agency could fill this role by functioning as  a clearing ­
house for relevant product and proc e s s  info rmation: publicizing 
particularly important hazards as they become known, requiring 
that firms provide workers or consumer s  w ith ac curate, complete 
information about the hazards a s s o ciated with their activitie s ,  and 
maintaining communications with industrial trade as sociations 
that e stablish voluntary s tandards and practi ce s .  The private 
market, s upplemented by ins uranc e and liability law, would then 
be able to incorporate the newly obtained information into the 
existing incentive structu1·e ,  The s e  conditions are mo re likely to 
be met for products that are bought fairly frequently and for hazards 
that have a fairly high risk, for then individuals will have more 
incentive to us e the information to their advantage, 
If increased information does not lead to economically 
warranted prevention, the source of the difficulty may be the 
s y s tem of liability, compens ation and insurance,  If  so, alte ring 
this s y s tem may be a mo re efficient strategy for reducing exposure 
to hazards than a s tandard - s etting proc e s s ,  One mechanism for 
increas ing incentives for safe products or workplace s  is  to increase 
the liability of fi rms, such a s  by  lowering s tandards of proof, 
raising compens ation limits in the Wo rkmen' s Compensation 
system, or imposing taxes on produc t - related or work- related 
accident s . 18
1 
Unfortunately, s afety regulators  ar� not empowered
181 For a clo s e r  examination of an injury tax, s e e  Robert S.  
Smith, " The Feasibility of an ' Inj ury Tax'  Approach to Occupational 
Safety, 11 Law and Contempo rary Problems,  Vol, .38,  No . 4 (Summe r­
Autumn 1974) ,  pp.  7 3 0 - 744, 
to alter the incentive s tructure of firms in the s e  way s ,  leading 
to exces sive r eliance on standards . 
Standards ar•J likely to be an efficient approach to safety 
p roblems in two ins tance s ,  First,  when decision units are 
nume rous and information complex, the savings in c entralized 
information proces sing may offset the lo s s  in efficiency that 
results if the extent of prevention is not based upon informed, 
individual market deci s ions , Second, if the nature of a hazard 
is  s ubject  to unc ertainty,  insurance markets and the liability 
s y stem can fail sufficiently badly that standards - - if respons ive 
to new information - - may be desirable , 
SAFETY REG ULATION IN PRACTICE 
The behavior of tw o maj o r  n ew s afety re gulatory agencie s ,
CPSC and OSHA, as  they began ope rations illustrates  how safety 
regulation w orks in practice, as compared with the p rinciples 
s ketched out above, The experiences with the s e  two agencies 
offer some basis fo r evaluating regulatory  inte rvention as an 
alte rnative to the admittedly imperfect  world of liability law and 
insurance. How safety regulation a c tually works can be seen in 
part by examining how the budgets of the a gencie s are allocate d  
among various functions ,  how prioritie s a re set, when and how 
standards a re prepared, and how they are enforced. The central 
p roblem of safe ty regulation is to provide regulators with the 
incentive and the resource s to attack effectively the s afe ty hazards 
ove r  which they have the greate s t  leve r age'. This has not been 
achieved in the past, largely because  Congre s s  has adop te d  an 
inappropriate c onceptual model of the nature of the problem of 
p roduct  and occupational safety. 
3 4  
B udget Allocations 
Be cause the rationale fo r having safety re gulation lies in 
part in the failure of the market to provide sufficient information, 
the budgets of safety regulatory bodie s might be expected to include 
s ub stantial expenditure s  for producing and dis s eminating informa ­
tion, particularly in the earlier years of regulation, Examination 
3 5  
of the budgets fo r the CPSC and OSHA reveal that this i s  not so.  
Table 2 gives the CPSC budgets broken down by activity, and Table 3 
gives the OSHA b udget,  
Ascerta ining the p referenc e s  of the agency in te rms of 
the allocation of its re sour c e s  is  normally extremely difficult
becaus e the Office of Management and B udget ( OMB ) ,  not the 
agency, submits a budget reque st  to Congres s ,  Only if the t rue 
prefe rences of the agency are revealed during its overs ight hearings 
can the nature of the OMB revis ions be at .least qualitatively 
inferred.  Fortunately fo r purpo s e s  of analy s i s ,  CPSC, unlike 
othe r r egulatory agencies ,  s ubmits its b udget requests  directly to 
Congre s s ,  with OMB relegated to the pos ition of submitting a 
competing budget based upon adminis tration polic i e s ,  
Congr e s s  and OMB make two type s  o f  cuts i n  agency 
19/ budget reque s t s .  - The first  is program cuts affecting the level 
!JI Richard F enno, The Pow er of the Purse,  B o ston: Little, 
B rown and Company, 1 9 66,  While Fenno analyz e s  budgeting in 
C ongre s s ,  the s ame conceptual model applies  to OMB. 
of activity ( acro s s - the-board cuts ) ,  The s econd type is object  o r  
categorical cuts ( removing certain tools available t o  the agency 
or affecting the appropriations for specific parts of the p rogram). 
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OSHA BUDGET (1000'• of $) 
197Z 1973 1 9 74 1975 1976 
Congressional OSHA Congressional OSHA Congressional OSHA Congressional Congreasional OSHA Congresaio�l 



















a) Federal 16,  793 
b) State Programs 7, 781 
Un.obligated Funds 
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1 1 7, 585 
* Note: These figures repres ent a slightly different categorization than the others and hence are not strictly comparable. The new scheme lists 
training expenditures for state enforcement officers as 11Training, Information and Education, 11 whereas the old scheme included these 
a.a part of 11State Progra.ma'1 under " Compliance �d Enforcement� u 
Sourcea: 1973 OSHA Request: Department of Labor and Health. Education. and Welfare Appropriations for 1973� Hearings before the Subcommittee 
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1973 Congressional Appropriations; Department of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations £or 1975. Hearings before 
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r e s out·ce s  allocate d  to the s tandards development proce s s .  
The appropriations figures show that Congr e s s  and the 
P r e s ident favor compliance activitie s  relative to analytical 
capacity. Fo r FY 75,  CPS C asked for a twenty - s ix percent
increase in s tandards analys i s  and a thirty per c ent inc reas e in 
compliance and enforcement. Cong1· e s s  appropriated a s ix p e r ­
c ent decreas e fo r s tandards and a five percent increase for com­
pliance and enfo r c ement, For FY 76, CPS C  asked for a s ixty
p e rc ent inc rease in re s ourc e s  for analys i s ,  The Pre s ident' s 
budget recommended ove r  a fifteen pe rcent decrease,  and Cong r e s s  
e ventually provided an inc rease o f  about six and one half per cent, 
w hich was ins ufficient to offs et inflation, For enforc ement for 
Fis cal Y ear 1 9 76 ,  CPSC asked for a twenty - two percent increase
while the Pres ident ' s  budget recommended a one percent inc rease,  
C ongres s  appropriated a three  percent increa s e .  
As CPSC Chairman Simpson put it, 
Such a reduction [in analytical capability J w ill especially 
impact upon the ability of the commi s s ion to addr e s s  the 
d evelopment of mandatory product safety standards and 
will limit the overall evaluation of the offeror concept a s  
embodied in the CPSA, 
Such a large and absolute reduction in funding, along 
with continued cons traints on s taffing, will have a devas -
tating impact on this commi s s ion. , .  Further,  if such 
funding restrictions are maintained in the long te rm, the 
commis sion has no choice but to cons ider s ub stantial 
s t ructural changes and adjus tments to p rovide the adop ­
tion of a purely reactive approach to pro duct s afety 
rath e r  than the planned and sys temative s tandards 
d ev elopment approach now envis ioned. �_]/ 
E.I Ibid , , pp. 8 1 7  and 868.
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OSHA' s budgetary history i s  similar to that o f  CPS C ,  
T h e  largest  element o f  the OSHA budget is compliance activiti<:1 s ,  
as  seen i n  Table 3 .  Congre s s ,  in acting upon the OSHA budget 
requests ,  has consistently added to the amounts reques ted for 
OSHA' s enfo r cement activities and decreased the amount reque sted 
for s upporting s tate enforcement activities , Standard s etting by 
OSHA r eceive s a very small po rtion of the budget : OSHA budget 
s ubmis s ions by OMB have requested between four and five per ­
cent of its budget for this p.irpos e ,  while Congre s s  has allo cated 
between four and s ix i;ercent . Info rmation gathering activitie s 
have not fared much better :  actual appropriations have been 
rising but l e s s  rapidly than the total budget of OSHA, leading 
them to fall from nine percent of its allocation in 1 9 72  to five
percent in 1 9 75 .  22 1
40 
22/ - B ecause of a change in aggregation me thod s ,  the 1 97 6  numb e r s
can not be recons tructed on a b a s i s  comparable to p a s t  yea r s  from 
ava ilable publications.  
Since 1 9 72,  the  OSHA process  fo r setting standards has
b een all but s t ymied by inadequate app ropriations , One major 
basis fo r OSHA s tandards is s uppo sed to be research by  the 
National Ins titute of Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) . 
NIOSH is responsible fo r gathe ring data on job - related hazards 
and perfo rming .s cientific analy s e s  of particular situations and 
s ubs tances that constitute hazards to work� r s .  NIOSH findings 
are summarized in " c riteria documents ,  11
. 
which are to be the
basis  of the standards adopted by OSHA. As a re sult, OSHA' s 
ability to s et standards is limited by the resources available to 
NIOSH to inv e s tigate hazards,  Thes e  resource s ,  in turn, have 
not been exactly generous , 
4 1  
In the health field alone, NIOSH es timates that the re are 
at least 42 ,  000  chemicals used in indus try that are pos s ibly hazardous 
to worke r s ' health, Of the s e , it has s elected 400 as particularly 
2 '!1  
. . ff d worthy of attention. - NIOSH doe s  not have s ufficient sta an 
2 3 /  - 1 1  Labor Report/OSHA Launches Dual Effor t  to Reduce Job 
Health Hazard s , " National Journal Repo r t s ,  Decembe r  7, 1 974, 
p .  1 8 3 1 .  
res earch res ourc e s  to make much headway agains t these  hazards,  
In fis cal 1 972  and 1 9 7 3,  the s ection of NIOSH respons ible for 
preparing c riteria documents had a total of 3 1  p o s itions , including 
clerical and s ec r etarial pers onnel, and managed to turn out 
thirteen documents .�4' 
24 / S H ' 1 0 72 - enate ea rings , p. • 
The s e  data indicate that Cong r e s s  does not w ant to plac e  
as much emphasis on info rmation gathering and evaluation capacity 
as safety regulatory agencies de sire,  This s ugges t s  that Congres s  
do es not fully recognize the informational p roblems a s s o ciated 
with effective s afety regulation, and that budgetary policies may be 
deflecting r egulators  from focusing on the very types of hazards 
that it make s the mos t  s ense to regulate,  
E s tablishing P riori ties 
B efore a r egulatory agency can b e gin to r egulate expo sure 
to hazards, it  mus t  fir s t  set  up p rocedur e s  for identifying the 
hazards that a re worth regulating, This requir e s  that p ro c edur e s  
b e  e stablished for a s s e s s ing the relative importance o f  hazards .  
I n  e stablishing prioritie s,  CPSC relies heavily o n  a Hazards 
Index that is de rived from a ranking of the s eve rity of injuries and 
the accident data from the National Electronic Inj ury Surveillance 
System (NEISS) .2 5 / NEISS provides aggre gate frequency and
'J&/ A clo se examination of NEISS and some of its failings can
be found in Steven Kelman, "Regulation by the Numbers - A Report 
on the Consume r P roduct Safety Commi s s ion, 11 The Public Interest, 
No, 36,  Summer 1 9 74, pp. 82 - 1 0 2 .  
s ev erity data o n  accident case s from a sample o f  hospital eme rgency 
rooms . Each month the total number of accidents a s s o ciated with 
e ach p ro duct cla s s  are reported. For each pro duct, the numb e r  of 
accidents causing a particular type of injury is  multiplied by an 
index of the " mean s everity" of that injury. Thes e  calculations are 
26/  s ummed to p roduce a s core fo r each product . -
2 6 /  s f c . . - Consumer Pro duct a ety omm1s s10n,
Washington, D. C, Vol 4 # 1 ,  July 1 9 75.  
NEISS New s , 
The rank ordering of pro ducts acco r ding to this s core  is  
used by CPSC in deciding which products to regulate ,  
A s  calculated, the Hazard Index is unbelievably arbitrary. 
The numerical weights a s signed to injuries  of different s everity 
are without any rational foundation. Thuu , .a death is s co re d  a s  
6 . 2 7 /  . d h • . d kl . 2 ,  5 1  points - against a p ro uct ,  w ereas
, 
a s pra1ne an e is  
��������������������-· ����������� 
2 7 / As Kelman points out, this is down from 34, 7 2 1 ,  w hi ch 
w a s  abandoned because the agency decided the latter numbe r  made
the index too dependent on !1eaths ,
42 
wo rth ten point s ,  To note  that mos t  people would gladly trade one 
death for 2 5 2  sprained ankles mis s e s  the main point of this fantasti­
cally arbitrary s cale. While considerable attention was devoted 
to constructing a qualitative ranking of the s everity of various 
kinds of inj urie s ,  no effort was devoted toward establishing some 
foundation for aggregating inj urie s or even for t e s ting the s ensitivity 
of the Hazard Index to alternative aggregation s chemes ,  
Anothe r  important shortcoming of the Hazard Index is  that 
it takes no account of the age or frequency of us e of the p ro duct. 
Since voluntary s afety standards are changed ev ery few years,  
p roduct age data are relevant to det ermining whether still more 
s tringent s tandards are nece s sary. Data on the frequency of 
exposure would enable the CPSC to dis tinguish between pro ducts 
that have a low accident rate per exposur e  but that are a s s o ciated 
with a relatively large number of  accidents becaus e they are 
ubiquitous , and products that are les s  frequently used but, when 
used, e sp e c ially hazardous . This distinction is impo rtant s ince 
i t  p rovide s  s ome insight into the leverage the CPSC is  Hkely 
to have on the safety of the product. The failure of CPSC to 
take account of exposure rates has led the agency to launch pro ­
ceedings to s et standards for s everal high - ranking sources of 
accidents over which the CPSC is likely to have little, if any, 
control. For example, the CPSC is hard at work investigating the 
pos s ibility of safety standards for matche s ,  kitchen knives and 
s taircase s .  While many people suffer burns,  cut thems elves and 
fall down s tairs ,  one wonders exactly how effective the c ommi s s ion 
can be in s i gnificantly reducing the incidence of any of the s e  accident s ,  
s ho rt of specificying that match flames be cold, knives b e  dull and 
stairways be horizontal, 
43 
B e cause  the Hazard Index fails to p rovide age -adjusted and 
exposure- adj usted info rmation, it is  unable to s eparate two quite 
distinct sources  of a decline in accident rates a s s o ciated with a 
44 
p ro duct, Promulgation of a s afety standard may cause  accident rate s 
to decline be caus e they actually make the product safer. O r  accidents 
may fall off because a totally ineffective s afety standard fo rces up 
the price of the product enough to caus e a maj o r  decline in its us e ,  
Even i f  t h e  purpo s e  of the agency w e r e  narrowly defined t o  be the 
elimination of the mo st important sources of accident s ,  the latter 
effect could be achieved far more effectively by s imply imposing a 
tax o r  complete, unadj udicatable liability on the product, rather than 
by requiring that s carce resources be used to manufacture an 
ineffective safety devic e  that reduces a ccidents only b e cause it 
makes the product expensive. 
The CPSC�adopted the Hazard Index while fully aware of 
m ost of the problems a s so c iated w ith it . While the cotnplete s et 
of r easons for this decision are not known, two facto rs  w e r e  clear. 
First, the agency was under considerable pres s ure fro m Congr e s s  
to begin regulating, and the agency w a s  concerned that i f  i t  failed 
to act with dispatch Congres s  might legislate its priorities .  Second, 
I 
r eflecting in part the attitudes of Cong r e s s ,  the agency specifically 
rej ected the use of econon1ic analys i s  in s etting prioritie s .  The 
B ureau of Economic Analysis  at the agency plays no role in s etting 
p rioriti e s .  Its role is  to p rovide the C PSC '."'ith estimates  of the
e conomic impact of propos e d  standards.  The rej e ction of economic 
analys i s  effectively prevented the agency £ro1n developing a method 
of s etting priorities that included cons ideration of concepts such as  
the potential leverage of  the agency on the s afety of a p roduct o r  
t h e  e conomic magnitude o f  .the benefits  i t  might p rovide through 
regulation. While the agency was correct in concluding that 
e conomic analysis could not p rovide a definitive j udgment on whether 
a p roduct ought to be regulated owing to inadequacies in the available 
info rmation, the CPSC threw out the baby with the bath by going to 
the extreme of regarding e conomic info rmation as i rrelevant. 
In addition to the Hazard Index, the CPSC also take s 
action on the basis of individual cas e information, The Consumer 
P roduct Safety Act establishes a complaint proces s by which 
citizens and groups can reque s t  that the agency inves tigate the 
s afety of a particular p roduct or brand of product. In addition, 
the follow -up interview s from NEISS cases als o  are used as a 
means of suggesting furthe r action, Finally, the CPS C has field 
offices spread acro s s  the country which provide an additional 
source of information th rough their contact w ith the public and 
their enfo rcement activitie s .  
The main difficulty with these  methods of generating 
info rmation - - and the rational for a more systematic process  
s uch as NEISS - - is  that they are somewhat haphazard, pos s ibly 
p roviding a bia s ed sample of s ignals about which p roducts actually 
constitut e  consume r hazard s ,  T he problem is particularly worri ­
s ome if the clients of the regulatory agency are diffuse, disorganized,  
and perhaps unaware of its data collection pro c e s s es and if  the 
agency has a relatively small field office sys tem, as is the case 
w ith CPS C. 
Like CPSC, which inherited NEISS from the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare,  OSHA, too, uses  info rmation 
s y s tems d eveloped by the Dep artment of Labor on the incidence of 
o n - the -job accidents ,  It also relies upon complaints filed directly
by worker s  and labor unions ,  OSHA also has an exceptionally large 
field inspection s taff compared to CPSC, and, finally, has developed 
a proc e s s  for identifying target industries and target health hazard s .  
4 5  
OSHA' s compliance activities a r e  governed by t h e  following 
s et of p riorities established in 1 9 73�.JJ/ 
2.]/ Senate 1 9 74 OSHA Hearings,  p. 9 7 3 .
PRIORIT Y 






Inv e s tigation of evidence of imminent danger 
Catas trophe and/ o r  fatality investigations 
Complaint inves tigations 
Special programs including target indus try 
and target health hazard inspections 
G eneral inspections and relat e d  activities 
The fir s t  and third categories are not very diffe rent. Both are 
triggered by complaints from employees or union rep res entative s ,  
T h e  " target industry" and " target health hazard" categories 
rep r e s ent OSHA' s attempt to concentrate its resources on w ork­
places with the worst record s .  This set of priorties responds 
to the wishes of Congre s s  as  r evealed by the legislative history 
2 9/ of the Occupational Safety and Health Act . - The tar g et industries 
'?5}/ Ibid.
and health hazards were identified in the following way: 
On the basis  of their relatively high injury rates ,  OSHA 
s electe d  five target industries for the fourth p rio rity 
category: longs horing; lumb e r  and wood products ;  
roofing and sheet metal; meat and me�t product s ;  and 
manufacturing of mobile homes and other t ransportation 
equipment, 
OSHA also s elected five health hazards as special 
targets for inspection coverage in the fourth priority 
category. Thes e  wer-e asbe s to s ,  cotton dust, s ilica 
dust, lead, and carbon monoxide, According to OSHA 
46 
the s ele ction of the health hazards was based on ( 1 ) extent 




. and ( 3) ability to adequately measure exposure
levels , -
l!!_/ Senate 1 9 74 hearings,  p .  9 74.
If the target programs are to be judged by the statistics on 
the results of OSHA' s inspections ,  they have not picked the worst  
industries and hazards as  target s ,  From July 1 97 3  through May 
1 974, OSHA made 8, 642 inspections in target industries ,  2, 2 5 1
i n  industries which might have target health hazards, and 6 0 ,  9 5 7
generai inspection s .  The percentage of initial inspections (as 
opposed to follow -up inspe ctions or reinspections )  that resulted 
in c itations was s ixty percent for the target . indust ries ,  s eventy -
six pe rcent for thos e  s uspected of having target health hazards,  
and seventy -nine percent for the general category industries, �/ 
3 1  I . - Senate hearrngs,  p .  9 7 6 ,
As with CPSC, the OSHA method for establishing priorities ,  
while on  the face of it  apparently systematic and rational, i s  not 
based on a solid conceptual model of why safety regulation might be 
worthwhile.  It s tands to reason that the hazardous occupations and 
substances  that are mo st commonly known would ·also be mo st 
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likely to be at least imperfectly understood by workers and employers ,  
and that, as a result, more effort would be made in  thes e cas e s  to  
develop s afety precautions , The mo st complex, long -term problems 
are the ones least likely to be dealt with adequately. By overlooking 
the rationale for safety regulation, the safety regulatory autho rity 
has ignored the is s ue of the amount of change in safety that it can 
b ring about through regulatory intervention. 
The OSHA data-gathering process  suffers from other 
problems as w ell. Before OSHA was established, job - related 
accident statistics were collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
as  well as  by the National Safety Council, Becaus e new definitions 
and procedures fo r collecting data were developed when OSHA was 
created, recent statistics are not comparable w ith the old, Thus , 
it is not po s s ible to tell what effect OSHA has actually had upon 
accident and illne s s  rates  in the aggregate or w hat has been the 
impact of specific OSHA standard s .  
Finally, OSHA, like CPS C, does not base i t s  priorities
or evaluate its s tandards on the basis  of economic analysis .  In 
fact, the legislation dealing with the s tandard - s etting p roce s s  
specifically rejects the weighing of cos ts and benefits as a criterion 
for judging the des irability of s tandards ,  ins tead mandating pre ­
vention as the only relevant objective of the agency, As  a result, 
OSHA, like CPSC, is required to throw away valuable information, 
Standards Development 
The heart of safety regulato.ry policy ap practiced by 
exis ting agencies is the setting of minimum standards of protec ­
tion from hazards , Legislation and ca s e  law have es tablished 
procedural and substantive boundaries for standard se tting 
activities .  The effects of the se  rules on  the standards that 
eventually are promulgated are sometimes quite subtle and, 
' 
perhap s ,  even unintentional. 
All regulatory agencies could adopt informational 
s trategies rather than s et s tandards.  As a p ractical matter, 
they rely almost  exclusively on standards.  For example, the 
Consume r Product Safety Act gives equal billing to both strategies :  
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A consmner product safety standard shall consist  of one 
or mo re of any of the following types of requirements : 
( 1 )  Requirements as to performance, compo sit ion 
contents ,  design, construction, finish or packaging 
of a consume r product. 
(2) Requirements that a cons umer product be 
marked with or  ac companied by clear and adequate 
warnings and instructions , or requirements 
respe cting the form of warnings or ins tructions ?2/ 
3 2/  
- Dept, of Housing and Urban Development -Independent Agencies 
Approp riations for 1 976 ,  Hearings Befo re the Subcommittee on 
H. U, D. -Independent Agencies of the House  Appropriation Comm, 
94 Congress ,  1 st  S e s s ,  ( 1 975 )  Pt , 4, p. 764. 
The major  elements of the CPSC' s informational s trategy 
have been the con s umer "hotline " - - in e s s ence,  a mechanism for 
providing info rmation over the telephone to consumers who call in 
with ques tions - - and short analy s e s  and tips to consumer s  in 
pre s s - release s tyle , The CPSC has not s eriously consider ed 
manatory labeling as  a s ubstitute for s tandards,  For example, 
ins tead of reg'1lating the design of power mowers,  CPSC could 
require manufacturers to label varying models according to the 
nature of the s afety devices on each model, the kind of accidents 
the s afety devices prevent, and the probability of serious injury, 
based upon data gene rated from NEISS, as sociated with each model 
of mowe r. 
One impediment to adopting·  this kind of informational 
s trategy is that the membe rs of Congres s ional ove rsight commit ­
tees  are not enthus ias tic about this approach. Congress  has been 
very critical of even the current minimal relia·nce on information 
s trategies ,  The references to the " hotline" in the vari ous 
appropriations hearings for 1 975 and 1 976  were all negative. For 
example, Congres sman T raxler commented, 
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This c o s ts $ 1 1 5, 000 and on the surface it would appear to 
be a good idea . Howe ve r we unde rs tand that ove r  nine ty­
eight percent of the [70 ,  000) calls received du
[
1ng this fis cal
year repre sent<'d  reque sts for information, 21 
21/ Ibid. 
This s tatement reflects a House Approp riations Committee Investi­
gation Report which labeled these  as "of  an inno cuous informational 
nature, 11 and " cons equently the need for this expenditure seems 
questionable, 1 1  Given the se signals from Congre s s ,  agencies cannot 
be expected to place much reliance ·on informational strate gie s ,  
A s  indicated above, standards are set in response either 
to petitions from interested parties or to sys tematic  data- gathe ring 
and evaluation activities within the agency. Surprisingly enough, 
industry has been quite active in us ing the petitioning process  to 
initiate regulation of its own product s .  At the CPSC during the fir st 
two years of the agency ' s life, indus try sources filed over s eventy 
percent of the petitions that w ere received by the agency, and two - ·  
thirds of  the petitions that were granted (Table 4 ) ,  Since many 
of the se petitions reque sted specific exemptions and relaxations 
with respect to existing standards,  the gros s figures  overstate the 
importance of busine s s  participation, Neverthele s s ,  bus ines s  
petitions were the s ingle most important source of agency actions 
to begin developing standards .  
T able 5 contains the nature and s ,ource of the petitions
filed under the Con s umer Product Safety Act during the s ame two 
ye ars (Column 1 in T able 5 ) , Forty per cent of the requests to. 
regulate a product under this Act came from the industry producing 
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TABLE 4 
PETITIONS TO CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION 
May 1973 to July 1 975 
Action Con.um.er Product 
Safety Act 
Hazardous Poiaon Prevention Admlniatr•tive 
Fla.mmable Fa.bric• Subetance Packa.ging Procedure• Total 

















2 0  6 6  




34 6 7  
Source: Conewnietr Product ·S�fety Commieelon Index, 2nd Quarter 1975, �ice of the Secretary. 
T.ABLE 5-
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT PET ITIONS 
May 1973 through April 1975 
Action Requested 
Source of Requests I Change of Order Ban 
Re gulation Law Applied or Other 
to Product R e call 
Firms and Industry 1 1  3 0 2 
Consumer Groups 5 1 3 1 
�' 
Individuals 7 0 2 3 
Government 3 � 0 0 0 
- - · Labor Organizations 1 0 0 0 
Total 27 4 5 6 
* 
Affliation, if any, not identified. 
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the product. Among the standards - setting procee dings initiated by 
industry are dockets dealing with swimming pool slides ,  extension 
cords,  glass  bottles,  archite ctural glas s ,  powe r mowers ,  aluminum 
wiring and fire extinguishers , Nonindustry sources  are respons ible 
for several proceedings ,  notably those  dealing with aerosol sprays, 
space heaters,  playground equipment, paint guns and step ladders ,  
The Consumer Product Safety Act sets  out detailed 
procedure s that govern the development of standards by the CPSC. 
The Act severely constrains the ability of the CPSC to develop its 
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own standards by requiring that it seek out other parties - - "offere r s "  
- - t o  develop s afety stand ards that deal with the problems i t  has 
identified .  3
4 / It may s crutinize these proposals ( subj e ct to its own
_J_4/ PL 9 2 - 5 73 , sections 7(b) (4)  and 7(d) ( 1) ,  The CPSC can 
develop s tandards if no suitable offerer out s ide of the regulated 
indus try can be found or  if an offerer fails to develop a satisfactory 
s tandard. 
re source limitations ) , and may contribute to an offerer ' s  cost s ,  
I f  an offer is  accepted under this subsection, the Commi s s ion 
may agree to contribute to the offeror ' s  cos t  in developing a 
propo s e d  consumer product s afe ty s tandard,  in any case in which 
the Commis s ion de termine s that such contribution is likely to 
result in a inor e  s atis factory s tandard then would be. developed 
without such contribution, . , Yi/ 
35 / PL 92 - 57 3 , section 7(d )  (2 ) .
The commis s ion has interpreted the intent o f  this pas sage as 
e s tablishing a policy of only partial reimbur s ement. Without full cos t  
reimburs ement, groups other than those  connected with the industr y  
are not likely to find i t  wor thwhile to become offerer s .  Peter Schuck, 
director of the Washington office of Consumer ' s  Union, which unde r ­
took to b e  offerer on the is sue o f  power mower s afety, raised this  
exact point with the oversight committee .  
[The commiss ion] has indicated that all other things being equal 
it will look favorably upon consumer cand idate s to be offe rer s ,  
But ther ein lies the problem, All other things are not equal. 
In particular - - and here the degree of my under s tatement cannot 
be overs tated - - consumer organizations are not equal to 
indu s tr y  groups in terms of financial resources neces sary to 
develop a technically complicated s afe ty s tandard as offeror , 
Indeed, I can say without fear of contradic tion tha t  s o  long as 
the funding for the offerer progr ams re1nains at i ts  pres ent 
level no consumer organization, with the pos sible exception of 
Consumer ' s  Union,  can afford to be an offeror . , , . I daresay 
, , . Consumer 1 s  Union will have to think long and hard before
it makes  thi s  sort of expenditure aga in. 36/ 
361 Consume r Product Safety Commis sion Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Senate Comme rce 
Committee, 94 Congre s s ,  1st Se s sion (1975 ), P• 2 3 , 
CPS C ' s  reimbur sement polic y  all but prevents the commis s ion from 
developing the various consume r groups as a clientele and as a 
source of major  input to the standard s development proces s ,  It 
also  mean s  the industry will be writing its own standard s .  
The very first stand ards case at the CPS C made the impact 
of the offerer reimbursement policy abundantly clear. An industry 
trade association successfully petitioned the CPSC to write standards  
for archite ctural gla s s ,  and then submitted a proposal that it be 
s elected as an offerer, In addition, a consume r organization - ­
National Consumers League (NCL) - - also proposed t o  b e  an offeror 
in conjunction with the American Society for Testing and Materials ,  
The CPSC, upon reviewing these  and two o�her proposals,  
unanimously agreed that the NCL proposal ranked fir st while that 
of the trade as sociation ranked se cond. NCL ins isted  on full 
reimbur sement of the costs of developing the standards - - including 
s alary c ompen sation for consumer repre sentatives  participating in 
the proces s ,  Eventually the CPSC broke off negotiations with NCL, 
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expre s s ing the belief that adequate consume r repre s entation could be 
obtained gr ati s .  Subsequently, the trade association won the offeror 
contr act, settling for reimburs ement of only $14, 175 to pay travel 
and per diem for the consumer ·representatives  that it intended to 
consult, The trade as sociation ab sorbed the remaining costs,  which 
were con s iderable j udging from its initial re imbursement request 
for $451, 500, fl_/ 
3 7 / "Opinion of Commis sioner B arbara H. Fr anklin on the
Selection of an Offe ror to Develop a Safety Standard for Architectural 
Glas s ,  11  CPSC, October 8, 1974,  
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Letting industry write its own s tandards i s  not neces s arily 
fatal to the development of reasonable regulatory ac tions.  If the 
commi s s ion knew what the s tandar d ought to be, it could effectively 
ensure it as an outcome , The Act requir e s  CPSC to develop regulations 
governing acceptance of offerors propo s als .  These  regulations are 
about 1 50 pages  long , .and provide ample justification for any propo sal 
not meeting CPSC expectations to be r ejected,  If the commi s s ion has 
s trong beliefs about the be s t  way to solve a s afety problem, it  can 
invoke this sec tion e ithe r to move the offeror closer to its own ideas 
or to  r eject  the proposal as not  repr e senting s atisfactory progress  
so that it  can find another offeror or begin i ts  own development of  a 
s tandard.3 81 If the commi s s ion had sufficient analytical capabilities
33 / PL 92 - 573 , section 7 ( e )  (2 ) .
the outcome s  of this process  via the offeror sys tem might not differ 
much from those  if the commis s ion developed its own s tandards ,  
If financial and per sonnel resources  are  not abundant,  the 
commis s ion mus t  limit its s crutiny of this proce s s  and hence its 
influence on the form, scope, and quality of the standards . The 
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resources o f  the CPSC are severely limited, as revealed b y  the 
analy s is of its budg et. The scarcity of analytical resourc es,  coupled 
w ith the CPSA offeror provis ions , effective! y relegate the commis -
s ion to a judicial po sition. It can a s s e s s  propo sals on the basis  of  
whether they address  the problems the commis s ion has cited, but 
it lacks the analytical resources to determine whethe r the standards 
actually solve the problem, The problem is compounded by the 
t ime limit s impo sed by the CPSA, which require that the s tandards 
p ropo sed by an offeror be adopted w ithin thirty day s , }.2_/ If it fails 
3 9/ b . d . - An offeror must e p1cke 30 day s after  a notice to set  a
standard is published, The offe ro r has 150 day s to report a s tand­
ard after being s elected. Since the entire process  is  limited to 2 1 0  
day s ,  this leaves 3 0 day s for evaluating an offeror ' s proposal. See 
PL 9 2 - 5 73 86 Stat.  1221, Sec, 7.  
to act in this time, a new regulato ry proceeding, including the 
search for another offeror, must be opened if the product is to be 
40/regulated. -
40 1 -- The agency can extend a proceeding, but to do so  it must  
s how caus e, which in  turn can be  challenged in  court and, in any 
event, leads inevitably to Congres s ional criticism at the next 
budget hearing, as dis cus sed below . 
Industry has seve ral incentives for wanting a standard­
s etting procedure that is under the s trong influence of bus ine s s .  
First,  if industry controls the standards,  the economic unce rtainties 
associated with safety regulation are reduc,ed: industry is  unlikely 
to impose so s tringent a s tandard that it effectively puts its elf out 
of busines s .  Second, because safety standards often cannot b e  
distinguished from design. standards, the regulatory proces s  offers  
the pos s ibility of creating an enforceable cartel to reduce competition, 
something a voluntary trade as sociation' s s tandards could not do a s  
41/ easily becaus e they cannot be enforced. -
411 See Michael Hunt, " T rade Associations and Self - Regulation:
Maj o r  Home Appliances,  11 in Richa rd E. Caves and Marc Roberts,  
Regulating the Product: Quality and Var iety, Cambridge: 
Ballinger, 1975 ,  
One egregious example of  the latter  has  already occurred 
at the CPSC. The offeror fo r developing s afety standards for 
bicy cles was the trade as sociation for Ame rican bicycle manu­
facturers .  The initial set of standards it proposed included compli ­
cated design standards that would have effectively excluded foreign-
42 / made bicy cles from the U, S. market. - The CPSC, unaware of
42 / John Forester, " The Toy Bike Syndrome, 11 B ike World,
October 1 9 73 . 
this feature of the proposed  s tandards ,  initially adopted them; how ­
ever, in respons e to heated outcries from cyclists,  recalled the 
standards and started the standard development proce s s  over again, 
Only because the product in que stion had a dedicated, organized, 
well- informed group of cons ume rs did an anticompetitive standard 
fail, 
OSHA, perhaps reflecting the better organization of labor 
unions compared to consumers ,  is not se t  up to be quite so reliant 
on indus try for developing s tandards.  For two years after it was 
established, OSHA was permitted to adopt as its own standards 
that had been set either by gove rnment agencies or by certain kinds 
of cons ensus organizations . (After 1972, the standard - s etting pro ­
cedure changed, being bas ed on NIOSH " criteria documents .  11 ) In 
these  tw o years , OSHA adopted numerous cons ensus standards, 
One feature of the standards OSHA has borrowed from 
othe rs  is that thes e standards are not as rigorous as the s tandards 
adopted by other federal regulatory agencies that regulate exposure 
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Table 6 
OCCUPATIONAL (OSHA) VERS US GENERAL 
POPULATION (EPA) ENVIRONME NTAL STANDARDS 
Ambient Atmo sphe ric Results 
Pollutant OSHA(TLV) 
S02
(ppm) . , , , , , , . , , , , ,  5
CO (ppm) . . . . . • . . . . • . . .  5 0  
N02 (ppm) • • • . • • . • • • •  , . •  5
Particulates (mg /m 
3) ,  , , , 5 
l
5 52
3 Lead(µ.g/m ) . , , • • • • • • • •  5 5 0  
1 Responsible fraction 
2 Total dus t 
EPA 
Annual mean 0, 0 3 
Maximum 24  hr, once per 
year O .  14 
Maximum 3 hr, once per 
year O .  50.  
Maximum 8 hr,  once per 
year 9 ,  0 
Maximum 1 hr, once per 
year 35 .  0 
Annual mean 0 ,  50  
Annual mean O. 075 
Maximum 24 hr, once per 
year 0 ,  66  
30 d�y mean (Calif, ) 1 .  5 
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Source: Testimony of  Samuel S .  Eps tein', M. D . , Case  Western 
Reserve Univer sity Medical S chool, in Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1 9 70 (Ove rsight and P roposed �_!Uendments) ,  Hearings before 
the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and 
Labor,  House of Representatives ,  Ninety- Third Congres s  Washington, 
D. C. 1975 ,  p. 1 62 .  
to the s ame hazards by other clas ses  of people,  Table 6 give s a .  
comparison of some OSHA standards and the s tandards set by EPA 
for exposure to the same chemicals . In each ins tance the EPA 
standard is much more s tringent. 
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A second feature o f  the s tandard s that came from consensus 
organizations is that they have evolved much more slowly than have 
industry s tandards in re sponse to new information. One busine s s ­
man from Texa s wrote to his congre s sman that he was caught i n  a 
bind by thi s  kind of inflexibility: 
One spe cific point is in regards to the pre s sure ve s sels which 
we manufac ture in ou.r plant for the oil  and gas indus try and 
refinerie s .  In order to retain our certification to build pre s sure 
ve s sels in accordance with ASME Boiler & Pre s sure Ve s sel 
Code , we mus t  con s truct them in accordance with the late s t  
edition o f  the Code, Howe ve r, the OSHA Regulations s till 
refe r  to previous editions of the Code. Therefore,  we could 
ge t caught in the middle in providing equipment for our 
custome r s .  4 3/ 
4 :¥  . - House 1 9 75 Hearmgs ,  p. 4 .  
Now that OSHA mus t rely on NIOSH in developing s tandards , 
the proces s  has become more cumbersome , in par t because NIOSH 
has produced so few criteria documents and in part bec ause the 
s tandard- setting proce s s  i s  slowe r when the analysis i s  done 
internally. NIOSH produced six criteria documents in 1972 ; by 
July 1 ,  1974  only one had re sulted in a standard. 
The charge of slow proceedings has also been levied at the
CPSC.  Despite a s tatutory limit of 210  days in developing s tandards ,
CPSC normally has  taken far longer . Commenting on this performance,
a r eport  o{ the House Appropriations Committee in 1 9 7 5  s aid :  "The
Consumer Product  Safety Commi s s ion has been in exi s tence two 
years and its record of  achievement to date is  lacking in  every area 
of its re sponsibilitie s .  1 1  44 / Senator McGee,  Chairman o f  the Senate 
44 I Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Independent 
Agencie s Appropria.tions for 1976.  Hearings Before the Sub ­
Committee on H, U. D. , Independent Agencie s of the House  
Appropriations Committee,  94th Congr e s s ,  1 st  Se s s ion (197 5 ) ,  
Pt. 4, P •  62 9 .  
subcommittee that oversees  CPSC appropriations , was also c r itical 
about the "lack of an initiative on the part of the commis s ion for 
s etting new s tandards under the act. The charge is  made that you 
inherited s everal s tandar ds from older legislative acts that were 
1 1 45  Itransferred to you, but you have not come up with any new one s ,  -
45 / Agr iculture, Environmental and Consume r Protection
Appropriation, Fiscal Year 197 5 ,  Hearings , Senate Appropriation 
Committee,  93 rd Congre ss ,. 2 nd Ses sion (1974) ,  Pt. l ,  P•  1640 . 
One source of Congre s s '  chagr in is the performance on the 
petitions Nporte.d in Table 5 ,  I n  1 9 75, the CPSC revealed i n  its 
oversight hearings that it had received forty -two petitions under the 
Consume r Product Safety Act, Four that werfi re solved had taken, 
on average, 265  day s ,  and ten mo re had taken an average of 3 2 6  
days and were s till pending. 461 Of c ourse, the Congre s s  did not
46 I Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare and Certain
Independent Agencie s Appropriations fo_! Fis cal Year 1976.  
Hearing s ,  Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Approp riations ,  
94th Congre s s ,  1st  Se s s ion (19 7 5 ) ,  Pt. 2 ,  P• 885.
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look to its own budgeting decisions as a sourc e of this lack of 
progress ,  or even ask whether rapid action is a des irable 
characteristic of sensible safety regulation. 
Compliance and enforcement 
The compliance ac ti vi tie s of safety regulatory agencie s 
fall into two categorie s.  First, agencies attempt to enforce the 
product, proce s s  and exposure s tandards that they have promulgated 
by inspecting faciHtie s and products . In this mode,  the s tandards 
provide a concrete set of c riteria for determining whethe r the 
inspected firm is  in compliance. Second, safety regulatory law 
als o  contains p rovisions that allow agencies  to take action in the 
ab sence of a standard if the hazard i s  determined to be sufficiently 
se rious .  Both types  of activities se rve not only to weed  out bad 
actors ,  but als o  to increase the incentive s of firms to take actions 
to reduce hazards .  
A s  an example of the range of  permissible enforcement 
activitie s ,  the Consumer Product Safety Act permits the CPSC to 
take certain reme dial actions if it finds a particular p roduct a 
1 1  substantial produc t hazard, " either because it doe s not me e t  a 
s tandard or because it pos se s se s  a "defect ,  • •  which create s  a 
· · f · j t th bl'  . .  47/ Th di' 1 cti'onssub s tantial risk o in ury o e pu ic.  e reme a a 
4_?/ P. L. 92 - 573  86 Stat. 122 1 Sec. l 5 (a) . 
available include requiring the manufacturer,  distributor or  
retaile r to  take any combination of  the following actions :  (1 )  to 
g ive notice that the defect  exists to the public, to othe r busine s s e s  
manufacturing, d istributing or  retailing the produc t, or  t o  known 
consume r s  of the product; (2 )  to repair or replace the product; or / 
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(3.) to refund the purchase  p rice of the product (le s s  a " reasonable 
allowance for use " ) .  48/ In the context of this section of the law,
4 8/ - Sec,  1 5  (c)  and (d ) .
the term " defe c t" has been interpreted to mean any characteristic 
of the product  that is  hazardous . It is  not applied just to an atypical 
mistake - - such as the action s the FDA might take in discover ing 
botul ism in a few cans of soup - - but to entire produc t line s that 
are di scove red to be hazardou s  in de s ign, Thus,  to enforce thi s  
part of the law requires on- the - spot de velopment of a pe rformance 
standard for an aspect of a product that has not previously been 
regulated. E ven though agency actions are subject  to judicial 
re view, the scope of po s s ible actions available to the agency, 
combined with ' the relatively low s tandards of proof the judiciary 
normally applie s to administrative decisions,  make s this an 
e specially powerful tool. 
One of the by-products of effective use of recall, repair 
and refund requirements is the impact they can have on small 
busine sse s and on competition, The fir s t  three " sub stantial 
product hazard" cas e s  dealt with by the CPSC demons tra te how 
roughly equivalent treatment of big and small firms is far more 
devastating to the latter than to the forme r. 
Two of the cas e s  dealt with products produced by 
corporation s  of moderate s ize:  a proceeding regarding the "Mini­
Mac" chain saw, manufactured by McCulloc;h Corporation, and 
a proceeding regarding Pre sto elec tr ic frying pans ,  manufactured 
by National Presto Indu s trie s .  The third proceeding dealt with. 
the Wel- Dex Electric Arc  Welder,  produced by a small Texas 
firm, Relco,  Inc. 
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In all three ins tance s the Commi s sion sought e s sentially 
the same action: a notifica tion of distr ibutors  and custome r s  
that the product  constituted a hazard, and a n  agreement to repair,  
replace  or refund, as per the provis ion s of the Act. The fir st 
two cases  we re te rminated within a few months without the 
ne ces s ity of a formal opinion and orde r by the commi s sion, as  
both companie s agreed to undertake corrective mea sure s  accept-
bl th . . :J..:l/ a e to e comm1s s1on, 
j;)_/ Orde r s  Terminating the Proceeding, Docket 74-1  (undated)  
and Docket 74-2 (May 9, 1975) ,  CPSC. 
Relco, Inc . , could not agree to the se  corrective mea sure s 
because the financial implications were too great. The defe cts 
cited by the Commis s ion could not be repaired, and replacement or 
refund wa s financ ially impos s ible. The company e stimated that, 
of the 2 0 0 ,  0 0 0  units it was asked to recall, if a s  many a s  1 0 ,  000
actually were returned the company would be bankrupted. 'j!2/ 
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'2!21 Inte rim Decision and Initial Orde r,  Docke t  74-4,  April 2 8, 197!' ,
CPSC. 
Neverthele s s ,  the CPS C  pe r s is ted in demanding the remedy 
it des ired, rejecting p roposal s by Relco to limit the number of 
model s to be recalled. 
A small firm, producing only a few models in its p roduct 
l ine , is more vulnerable to any kind of action again s t  it  with re spect 
to e ithe r  regulatory intervention or c ivil liability actions, for the 
penalties  or damage award s are more likely to exceed its net worth. 
B ut regulation is more threatening because of the lower standards 
of  p roof, In the Wel-Dex case, Relco could not have been found 
liable for anything, for none of the 2 0 0 ,  000 welde r s  that  it had 
sold had been known to cause a s ingle injury. The basis  of the 
CPSC decision was nut any actual accidents, but an engineering 
s tudy that pointed out seve ral design feature s of the device that 
could cause  injury. 
In principle, the consequence of numerous enfo rcement 
actions like that against  Relco would reduce competition by 
winnowing out small firms.  In practice, agencie s have not 
imposed a large enough number of bankrupting penaltie s to 
make their actions constitute more than very infrequent, if 
random and arbitrary, events , 
While compliance activitie s can be the re sult of citizen 
omplaints, the primary method of enforcing safety s tandards 
; through on- s ight inspections of randomly- selected bu s ine s s  
s tablishments. All safe ty re gulatory agenc ie s suffe r to varying 
egre e s  from two difficultie s in undertaking enforcement activitie s: 
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1e  problem of identifying site s  to inspect  and the pauc ity of inspectors .  
Busine s s  firms do not  have to report to the relevant 
afety regulatory age ncie s that they intend to ynter a bus ine s s  
1at might b e  o f  interest  to the regulators .  Consequently, one 
I 
f the main tasks  of enforcement officers  i s  to identify firm s in 
1e indus trie s that are subject to standards. This can pre sent 
1ajor problems if, a s  is  the case with food regulation by the FDA, 
,1e number of plants is large and unstable, 
De spite relatively large budgets for enforcement 
n the safety regulatory agencie s ,  field enfor�ement s taffs
.re s till small. OSHA, fo r example, has the largest  
nforcement budge t of  all safety regulatory agencie s , but 
a s  fewe r inspectors  than so:i:ne of the insurance companie s that 
ell Workman' s  Compensation insurance,  even though it is  
intere s ted in a broader range of occupa tional safety problems 
than are covered by Workman ' s  Compensa tion and ha s a b igge r 
enforcement problem than insurors  do, 
A central problem for regulators  is how to allocate 
enforcement per sonnel. One element of the decision has to do 
with the distribution of inspec tion s by size of firm. OSHA has 
attempted to spread its re source s over both small and large 
establishments. Table 7 shows the division of initial inspections 
made be tween July 1 972 and May 1 974 according to the size of 
the e s tablishment. The OSHA field ope rations manual sets out 
the procedure for choo sing indus trie s to inspect. The directed  
procedure is , fir s t, to select targe t  countie s within the region, and 
then to inspe ct . at least  one small and one large e s tablishment from
each two- digit SIC code group in the general industry catego r ie s .  
Based on the in s·pe ction history to date , a large plant i s  likely to be 
vis i ted by an OSHA in spe ctor once every ten yea r s ,  while small 
plants are are vis ited e ven le s s  frequently. 
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The infre quency o f  inspe ctions blunts the effectivene s s  of 
enforcement as  an incentive to c omply, Equally important are the 
minimal consequence s of being found out of compliance,  From July 1 9 72 
to March 1974, OSHA cited 364, 9 5 5  safety violations.  Table 8 shows 
the distribution of violation s by seve ri ty and the remarkably small 
penaltie s that have been impo sed,  The National Associa tion of 
Manufacture rs  ha s developed some crude e stimate s of the co sts  
of  complying with OSHA s tandards,  which are shown in Table 8,
The small s ize of fine s, the infrequency of inspections and the fairly 
steep compliance costs make compliance worthwhile only if an 
employe r expects to be cited for several hundred willful , repeat or 
. . t d . 1 t' h h 
51/immmen angs r v10 a ions w en t e inspector finally arr ive s .  -
51/ - If a large plant i s  in spe cted once eve r y  ten yea r s ,  the
annualized expected c;ost  of a willful violation is $110 .  40 .  If the 
c omplying safe ty equipment costs $3 50 , 000,  the equipment lasts 
twenty years ,  and the firm can borrow funds for purchas ing the 
equipment at  nine pe rcent inte re st, the annualized co s t  of compliance 
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i s  about $80,  50 0 .  Dividing the latte r by the forme r,  a firm must expec t  
more than 700 c itations when the inspe ctor finally arrive s in o rder for 
the compliance actions to be worth taking . 
Anything le s s  and it is cheape r to avoid c ompliance and pay the fine s 
when one is caught. Since the total numb e r  of c itations  in this category 
during the fir st  twenty months of OSHA ' s  inspe ction program wa s only 
532 , it is  safe to conclude that OSHA doe s not provide much o! an 
incentive to improve occupational safety. Of cour se,  the ineffectivene s s  
of OSHA' s enforcement system to produce an incentive for c ompliance 
is not particularly important if, as argued above, the standards are 
not rigorous enough. to have much of an effe ct  on job- related  accidents 
and illne s ses  or are developed primarily in a reas whe re standard-· 
se tting ha s the lowe st  pay- off. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding analysis  leads to both positive and negative 
conclusions about the pre sent system of uafe ty regulation. On the 
po sitive s ide, it is clear that the re a re indee d  occa sions when 
efficient governmental intervention in the f�rm of s tandard- s e tting
regulation is called for, On the negative side,  the existing safety 
regulatory agencie s ,  to the extent that they follow the patterns  of 
CPSC and OSHA, are not de signed fo deal effectively with the very 
types of  cas es  in which s tandards are  mos t  appropriate. 
TABLE 7 
OSHA CITATIONS, JULY 1 972 - MARCH 1 974 
Catego ry 






Number of Citations 
360,  1 02 
4 , 33 0 
5 2 3 
3 64 , 95 5  
Ave rage Fine 
$ 1 6 
$ 648 
$ 1 ,  104 
$ 25 
Willful and repeat violations can be either s e rious or non- s e rious, 
Source: Senate Hearings ,  p. 9 6 7, 
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TABLE 8 
OSHA INITIAL INSPEC TIONS FROM JUL Y 1 972 
TO MAY 2 9 74 BY SIZE OF ES TABLISHMEN T  
tmbe r o f  employee s  Inspection s 
Number  Percent 
to 15 32 ,  184 39 
to 2 5  9 ,  138 11 
and over 40, 660 50 
Total 81, 982 100 
urce: Senate Hearings, p. 976 
TABLE 9 
COS T  OF COMPLIANCE WITH OSHA STANDARDS 
Number  of Employees 
1 to 100 
101 to 500 
501 to 1, 000 
Cost of Compliance 
$ 3 5 , 000 
73 , 500 
3 50, 000 
urce: Robert Steward Smith, The Occupational Safety and 
ialth Act: Its Goals and Achievements,  Am.e r ican Ente rprise 
s titute, Washington, D. C . , 1976 ,  P• 62 . 
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When targets are well cho sen, safety regulatory agencie s 
can be effective . The development of mandatory s tandards for 
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baby c rib s illus trate s  safety regulation at its be st, and is  instructive 
in that it demonstrate s how a sen sible regulatory proces s  works. 52./
s2 I - Much of the following at1alysis  is from Kelman, .2£• cit. ,
PP• 84-6.  
In 1 96 8 ,  a Pre sidential commis sion dis covered that the 
spacing between the slats of baby crib s  was sufficiently wide that, 
under certain conditions ,  the entire body of a baby could slip 
between the slats until s topped by its s kull. The baby would then 
s trangle itself a s  it hung outside the crib. 
The c rib problem had two feature s .  First, no one was 
collecting data in a fa shion that  would enable anyone -- the govern­
ment or  the indus try -- to be aware of the problem, and accidents 
were too infrequent for the pre s s  and consume r s  to have become 
ale rted to it. Second, once the problem was recognized, no one 
knew what kind of safety standard would deal with it  effe ctively. 
The problem was next addres sed by the trade a s sociation 
of crib manufacture r s .  Without benefit of any sys tematic analysis ,  
the manufactur e r s  voluntarily adopted a s tandard of 3 , 25  inche s 
between slats, down from 3 . 5 inche s prior to the inve stigation by 
the Pre sident' s Comm.is sion. Next, the Bureau of Product Safety 
of the Food and Drug Adminis tration -- a precursor of the CPSC 
commi s sioned a r e search project  to measure the size of infants ' 
buttocks  a s  part of a large r p roject  on various a spects of infant 
anthropometry. The s tudy e s timated that the buttocks of five 
percent of infants could be compre s sed by the p re s sure of thei r  
own weight to a diameter o f  2 .  375  inche s or le s s ,  nearly an inch 
smalle r than the industry s tandard. In April 1 973 , a mandatory 
spacing s tandard of 2 .  3 7 5  inche s wa s adopted.  
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The key to :he suc ce s sful conclusion of the c rib slat case  
was  the role the FDA played in gene rating the information and 
analysis that made a rational design standard po ss ible.  The e s sence 
of the crib problem was the lack of unde r s tanding of the nature of 
the hazard by participants on both side s of the marke t. Once the 
FDA undertook to analyze the problem, the actual promulgation of 
mandatory s tandards was anticlimatic. Since the s tandards 
imposed e s sentially no costs on anyone and s ince the industry had 
already e stablished p rocedur e s  for voluntary adoption of crib slat 
spacing s tandards,  the mandatory s tatus  of the fede ral s tandard 
was probably unnece s sary once the basis for a rational s tandard 
had been established.  
One major problem with the existing agencie s is  that the 
legislation e s tablishing them and the budget appropriation proc e s s  
they unde rgo annually are based on  a n  implicit model o f  setting 
s tandards that is at variance with that which accounts fo r the 
succe s s  of the crib slat case .  The implicit a s sumptions underlying 
the legislation are: ( 1 )  that the e s sence of the safety problem i s  
the pre sence o f  well-defined, clear-cu t  hazards to consume r s  and 
worke r s  that can be avoided in a rathe r s traightforward fashion; 
(2 ) that identifying a reasonably effective way of preventing them 
can be accomplished by a brief, cursory inve s tigation; and (3 ) that 
the principal cause  of inadequate p roduct ind occupational safety 
is "bad acts" by unethical busine s smen. In keeping with the se 
a s sumptions ,  agencie s are pushed to develop a large number of 
standards ,  with underlying justifications that mee t  the relatively 
loo se s tandards of proof required in administrative procedure s ,  in 
a relatively short  period of time. 
The provi sion in the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
enabling OSHA, during its fir s t  two years ,  to adopt as mandatory 
standa rds the exposure limits recom1nended by national consensus 
organizations illus trate s the Congre s sional desire for speed, 
When formulated, the se standards were not intended to be made 
mandatory, nor were they de s igned to be univer sally applicable, 
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nor we re they expected  to b e  pe rmanent. The re sult of this approach 
to safe ty regulation is  that the agencie s have all too often set 
standards for what seem to be frivolous hazards.  It i s  no accident 
that some of the earlie s t  OSHA standards we re on the type and 
location of toilets, for example, and that CPSC is  busy regulating 
matche s .  
The main fallacy in the current approach is that the 
market and the liability system are far more likely to deal reason­
ably well with easily identifiable and easily avoidable hazards than 
with more complex hazards that  are only partly under s tood. Trade 
a s s ociations ,  lacking due proce s s  procedu ral requirements , are 
likely to act more flexibly, more quickly, and more expertly than 
regulatory agencie s in dealing with the fir s t  cla s s  of p roblems . 
Thu s ,  safety regulatory agencies have been designed to focus on 
the is sue s on which they have the least  to contribute. 
Re gulato r s  have seve ral diffe rent types of ta sks . They 
a re asked to be objective analysts in identifying the nature of a 
safety problem and its pos sible remedie s .  The y are a s ked to be
conduits of political value s in  de ciding whether prevention of a 
hazard is worth doing. And they are asked to be a police force in 
finding bad actors  who produce products that do not mee t  safety 
standards .  
All this would be difficult enough, b u t  Congre s s  has 
de s igned the agencie s so that they can not carry out any 0f th.e se 
activitie s effe c tively. Re gulation makes the mos t  sense in 
uncertain area s the private marke t can not handle . Ye t the agencie s 
have insufficient re source s to do res earch, and in any event are 
made dependent  upon indu stry for providing information and devel­
oping standard s .  The agencie s are mandated to ignore economic 
analysis in setting p rioritie s  and developing s tandards, which 
prevents them from developing a decision-making proce s s  that 
would lead them to attack the problems they have the best  chance 
of solving. Finally, in enforcement activitie s ,  the agencie s a re 
hamstrung by the procedural le thargy of regulatory proce s se s  
and case law in penalyzing violators .  
I f  Congre s s  is  serious about safety regulation, it  should 
focus regulatory activities on problems that markets are least  
able to solve. One s tep is to deempha size regulation on mundane 
matters .  For example, OSHA could be relieved of the re sponsi• 
bility of trying to prevent industrial accidents and left free to 
concentrate on the more complex problems of health hazards .  
Ins tead of se tting s tandards a s  a means of  reducing indus trial 
accidents , either an injury tax or a strengthening of Workmen' s 
Compensation would be at lea s t  a s  effe ctive , and very likely 
cheape r.  Even if  Congre s s  we re not to entirely �emove the S from
OSHA, it could allocate mo st of the re source s of the agency to 
health questions ,  saving safety efforts for exceptional circumstance s .  
B e cau se marke ts are mos t  likely to deal inadequately with 
the mos t  complex safety i s sue s ,  Congre s s  should give agencie s 
sub stantially larger res earch budgets.  Re search capacity should 
be in the agency, not separated  as NIOSH is from OSHA, so that 
its activities can reflec t  the prioritie s of the regulatory authority. 
The re search s kills should_ 
include e conornic analysts as well a s
technicians,  and both should b e  used in aiding the regulato r s  in 
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s etting priorities as w ell as developing standards . One criterion 
fo r opening a proceeding should be the leverage of the agency 
against the problem, which implie s  that an agency should be able 
to do considerable research on a particular hazard befo re 
formally opening a standard - s etting proceeding. Hand - in - hand 
w ith a res ear ch s trategy must come a r elaxation of the time 
constraint s on the s tandards development proc e s s .  
Agencies should b e  encouraged t o  place greater reliance 
on informational st rategies,  especially the promotion of more 
_ effective  volunta ry standards by industry . This avoids the 
expense cif cumbersome administrative procedur e s ,  Furthermore,  
it  takes advantage of  the greater flexibility of indus try in changing 
s tandards, which is of value if growing knowledge rapidly make s 
each s ucceeding standard obs olete,  Of cours e,  becaus e of the 
dang e r  of indus t ry capturing the coercive pow e r  of gove rnment, 
industry standards make s ense only if they are voluntary and only 
if the agency has sufficient analytical capability to evaluate them, 
Congre s s  should also take a more active role in judging 
the manne r and extent of enforcement of a standard. One approach 
would be for Con gre s s  to legislate fine s ,  or range s on fine s ,  for 
variou s degre e s  of noncompliance with a s tandard once i t  i s  
promulgated.  This would enable Congre s s  implicitly to make a 
judgment about how rigorou sly a standard should be pursued .  
Fines could be inc reased through time to p rovide increa sing 
incentive to adopt pre.ventive measure s without causing immediate 
e conomic disruption. Alte rnatively, c itizens c ould be offered 
b ounti e s  for finding firms that are not in compliance.  In general, 
too little use has been made of incentive s to obtain better s afety 
performance.  
Whe the r  the se actions would make regulation of p roduct 
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and worker safety effective is  surely problematical. The se 
recommendations a s sume, for example, tha t agencie s can a ttrac t  
and retain skilled analys ts i n  s ignificant number s ,  and that 
patte rns of increasing lethargy and industryMorienta tionl that 
have become familiar in other regulatory agencie s w�not
p revail in s afety as  well. But the preceding recommendations 
are nec e s sary, if not sufficient, fo r effective s afety regulation. 
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